Conflict and Social and Political Preferences: Evidence from World War II and Civil Conflict in 35 European Countries

Pauline Grosjean

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Abstract

This paper uses new micro-level evidence from a nationally representative survey of 39,500 individuals in 35 countries to shed light on how individual experiences of conflict shape political and social preferences. The investigation covers World War II and recent civil conflict. Overwhelmingly, the results point to the negative and enduring legacy of war-related violence on political trust and perceived effectiveness of national institutions, although the effects are heterogeneous across different types (external vs. internal) and outcomes (victory vs. defeat) of conflict. Conflict spurs collective action, but of a dark nature, one associated with further erosion of social and political trust.

Keywords: Conflict, social capital, state capacity, Europe, Caucasus, Central Asia

1. Introduction

There are diverging views in the literature on the political legacy of conflict. A long tradition in economic and political history has characterized war and inter-group competition as preconditions for state formation and nation building, particularly in Western Europe (Tilly and Ardant 1975; Tilly 1985). Standing in sharp contrast with this "state-building" view, others have emphasized the political and social disintegration that has often followed conflict, particularly in the developing world. The proponents of this second, "conflict trap" view argue that conflict leads to development in reverse, weak states and further risks of political violence down the line (Collier et al. 2003, Collier and Hoeffler 2004). The contrast between external conflict, supposed to foster state capacity, and internal conflict, with opposite effects has been illustrated more recently in the theoretical literature (Besley and Persson 2009, 2010). However, the lack of systematic data across different countries and different types of conflict and the difficulty of drawing causal inference from cross-country macro-level variation have limited empirical contributions to this debate. The social and institutional legacies of conflict, despite being "arguably the most important", remain the "least understood of all war impacts" (Blattman and Miguel 2010, page 42).

This paper uses new micro-level evidence from a nationally representative survey conducted in 35 countries: the Life in Transition Survey (hereafter LITS), to shed light on how the experience of conflict has shaped political and social preferences. 39,500 individuals were surveyed in 35 countries of Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia in the summer of 2010 and were asked similar questions on personal and family (parents and grandparents) war exposure, political attitudes and socio-economic background. The investigation covers World War II and civil wars in the former Yugoslavia, Central Asia and in the North Caucasus. Such rich data

provides evidence on the short and long term effects of different types of conflict on individual political and social preferences.

Of particular interest is the legacy of conflict on political and social norms that matter most for economic and political post-war recovery. Chief among these are state capacity and social capital. State capacity refers to the state's ability to implement a range of policies, from raising revenue to enforcing contracts and supporting markets (Besley and Persson 2009). Key ingredients of state capacity consist of the legitimacy and effectiveness of institutions. Legitimacy is measured in this paper by respondents' declared trust in different state institutions. State effectiveness is measured by respondents' assessment of the quality of institutions. The inclusiveness and the legitimacy of political institutions have been described as important determinants of growth (Acemoglu 2003, 2005, Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni 2010, Besley and Persson 2009, 2010), market development (Greif 2012), economic liberalization (Grosjean and Senik 2011) and post-conflict political recovery (Bigombe, Collier and Sambanis 2000). Social capital refers to values and beliefs that sustain cooperation (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2010). An ever-growing literature stresses the positive role that generalized norms of morality play in growth (Knack and Keefer 1997), the functioning of markets (Fafchamps 2006) and institutional quality (Tabellini 2008, 2010). Following recent literature on the social legacy of conflict, group membership and civic participation are also used as measures of social capital.

There are three main findings in this paper, and each constitutes a contribution to a separate strand of the literature. First, the paper contributes to the debate between the conflict trap and state-building models. Cross-country results indicate that winning an international conflict is associated with effects that are consistent with the state-building model, while the effect of civil wars and of losing international conflict is opposite. However, drawing inference from cross-country results is jeopardized by the presence of endogeneity and simultaneity bias between

conflict and social and political preferences. This paper alleviates such issues by investigating within-country, and even within-village variation. Within country, the evidence argues overwhelmingly towards the conflict trap model. Any type of victimization is associated with lower perceived legitimacy and effectiveness of national institutions. Conflict spurs collective action, but of a kind that is further associated with the erosion of social and political trust.

This last result is a second contribution of the paper, which is to the emerging micro empirical literature on conflict and collective action. While the paper confirms prior results that conflict stimulates collective action (Bellows and Miguel 2009, Voors et al. 2012), it sheds light on its complex – and dark nature. Victimization in a civil war and a lost international conflict lead to collective action that is associated with further erosion of social and political trust. This result is consistent with Cassar, Grosjean and Whitt (2013)'s evidence on the effect of conflict experience on fostering bonding rather than bridging social capital. It also resonates with recent findings by Satyanath, Voigtlaender, and Voth (2013), which illustrate that a dense network of civic associations was instrumental in the downfall of democracy in interwar Germany.

Last but not least, the findings on the enduring legacy of World War II on individuals' political and social preferences echo an emerging literature that highlights the resilience of social norms over time and the long-term influence of violent events. Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) show that the slave trade in Africa has had a lasting influence on political and interpersonal trust in Africa. Grosjean (2011) investigates the persistence of norms of interpersonal violence. The findings in this paper also contribute to understanding why levels of institutional trust and social trust in Central and Eastern Europe are so persistently low (Rose 2004). An early hypothesis was that this was due to the legacy of repressive Communist regimes. Although supported by some empirical evidence (Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln 2007), recent findings have undermined the

importance of this factor (Roland 2004, Grosjean 2011). This paper suggests the legacy of violent conflict as an important explanatory factor.

The approach and results of this paper are subjects to two main caveats. The first deals with the reliability of survey responses related to war exposure. To address this, survey statistics are compared to existing secondary data sources on war victims. The correlation is higher than 0.9. The second caveat deals with the econometric identification of the causal effect of war. To address concerns about selection into victimization, I employ several strategies. First, the results are robust to controlling for a large number of characteristics, including determinants of victimization, such as communist party membership, religion, or income. Second, the results are robust to village fixed effects, which isolate the variation in violence experienced across neighbors within the same village. Third, I restrict the attention to the sub-sample of people who have never moved, in order to rule out that our results are due to selective migration. Last, results related to WWII cannot be due directly to reverse causality, since respondents were not directly targeted (their parents or grandparents were).

Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 presents some background on conflict in the region. Section 4 introduces the data and discusses the quality of the survey measures. Section 5 presents the empirical strategy. Section 6 discusses the results, both across and within countries. Section 7 concludes.

2. Literature

2.1. Theoretical underpinnings of the relationship between conflict and preferences

The view that "war makes states" is chiefly based on the interpretation that wars and inter-group competition were preconditions for state formation and nation building in Western Europe (Tilly 1985). Such a positive view of war and its consequences has recently been

challenged, famously so in a 2003 World Bank report, which highlighted the political, economic, and social disintegration that often follows conflict, particularly in the developing world (Collier et al. 2003, Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Although they stress that "civil war differs radically from […] international war" (Collier et al. 2003, page 11), the theoretical underpinnings of such a distinction are, however, unclear in the report.[1]

A clearer underpinning of the role played by conflict in the emergence and evolution of social preferences and of a fundamental difference between international and internal conflict can be traced back to Darwin (1873) and are discussed further by Bowles (2006). The hypothesis is that in the context of frequent and deadly inter-group conflict, survival of the fittest group favors groups abounding in altruists and prosocial individuals, who are ready to cooperate with one another. Such selective pressures open a gap between insiders and outsiders: a differential treatment that dictates generosity towards the insiders but selfishness toward the outsiders, those who represent a threat - a behavioral gap referred to in the literature as parochialism (Bowles 2006; 2008; 2009; Choi and Bowles 2007; Boyd and Richerson 2005). Parochialism has positive implications for trust and altruism, but only within the boundaries of one's group. This implies that different types of conflict will have different legacy. If the conflict involves an entire nation against another, trust towards other nationals and towards national level institutions may be enhanced. If, on the contrary, neighbor is turned against neighbor, one may expect the opposite.

A related distinction between external and internal conflict and the implication for state-building has recently been formalized in a series of papers by Besley and Persson (2009, 2010). In their interpretation, the difference lies in that external warfare generates common interests that

[1] Such a distinction is not straightforward. Tilly (1985) for example argues that external wars are just complements of internal wars in that: "the very logic by which a local lord extended or defended the perimeter within which he monopolized the means of violence and thereby increased his return from tribute, continued on a larger scale into the logic of war" (page 184-185).

bridge the gap across groups, while internal warfare has an opposite effect. A higher risk of external conflict is modeled as an increase in the taste for common public goods. Since public goods are financed through taxation, this raises the incentives of the state to invest in state capacity.[2] Internal warfare has an opposite effect through the political instability that goes with it. Political turnover means handing the capacity to tax to the opposition, which may turn redistribution against the current incumbent. The predictions of this model are clear: external warfare leads to higher state capacity, internal warfare to weak states and possibly a conflict trap. This last view is corroborated by Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2009), who argue that the threat of military coups may entice weak states to remain engrained in a civil conflict since putting down the conflict often require reinforcing the military. Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti (2013a) model the negative legacy of conflict on inter-group trust: conflict signals the negative qualities of the opponent group, such as a negative propensity to trade or, more generally, other negative qualities, such as dishonesty or untrustworthiness.

2.2. Empirical evidence on conflict and social and political preferences

In their review of the consequences of civil war, Blattman and Miguel (2010) stress the importance of the question yet the paucity of the empirical evidence on the evolution of institutions during and after a civil war. The presence of omitted variables correlated both with the occurrence of conflict and the quality of institutions as well as reverse causality issues[3] make interpretation of cross-country patterns difficult. Acknowledging these issues, the empirical literature has instead turned to within-country studies of the effect of civil war on individual

[2] State capacity includes legal capacity, the ability to protect property rights and enforce contracts, and fiscal capacity, the ability to raise revenue through taxation.

[3] Djankov and Reynal-Querol (2010) argue that institutional quality is one of the driving factors of civil war.

attitudes, preferences and behavior in specific country case studies. An emerging and seemingly robust finding in this literature is that experiences of violence reinforce local collective action. In the case of, respectively, Sierra Leone and Uganda, Bellows and Miguel (2009) and Blattman (2009) find that violent civil conflict strengthens local collective action, political engagement and voting. Such patterns are consistent with field experimental evidence on war and social preferences. Bauer et al. (2010) find that war experiences reinforce parochial altruism (in-group favoritism) in children affected by an international conflict in Georgia. In Burundi, Voors et al. (2012) show that individuals with more violent experience display more altruism towards their neighbors. Whitt (2012) find strong resilient impartiality norms among Bosnian victims of the Yugoslav civil war, even towards non co-ethnics.

While such findings stand in contrast with the grim theoretical predictions on the legacy of civil conflict on social capital and state capacity that was reviewed above, they only rely on specific country case studies and it is hard to know how general the results are to other conflicts and other dimensions of trust. Most of the evidence reviewed above is based on ethnic conflict and intra-group trust. Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti (2013b) find detrimental effects of conflict on inter-ethnic trust and trade in Uganda. Cassar, Grosjean and Whitt (2013a, 2013b) find similar negative effects among both victims and combatants of the Tajik civil war. Their results also highlight that local collective action should not be interpreted as having necessarily positive implication for social cohesion and state-building. They find that even though conflict experience is associated with higher participation in groups, such collective action is actually associated with *lower* social trust and greater opposition to the state. The question of what collective action and participation in groups really capture remains debated in the sociological literature (Portes 1999). Pierre Bourdieu's (1985) concept of social capital as participation in groups was not a view of social harmony but rather of individuals and groups struggling for power in order to push their

own interests. Portes (1998) notes that the downside of within-group favoritism is exclusion of outsiders and inter-group antagonism. Bourdieu also stressed the symbolic violence exerted by dominant groups on the rest of society. In a recent paper, Satyanath, Voigtlaender and Voth (2013) find a positive relationship between the density of civic associations and the Nazi Party's rise in interwar Germany, highlighting the "dark side" of social capital.

2.3. Summary and hypothesis

To sum up, the literature suggests a positive legacy of international conflict, which is supposed to foster common interest and state capacity. While this may be a reasonable assumption when considering the ex-ante risk for external conflict, common interest may fall apart after the end of the conflict, especially in the case of a defeat. In particular, we expect that:

- The legacy of international conflict on political and social preferences is contingent on its outcome. (H1)

- Only international conflict that ends in victory is associated with higher trust towards formal institutions (H2), and higher perceived efficiency of formal institutions (H3), higher generalized trust (H4), and bridging social capital (H5)

While the theoretical literature predicts a negative legacy of conflict on pro-social preferences and on state capacity, empirical evidence so far has been mixed. Some studies have found positive legacy on intra-group trust, but opposite effects have been found for inter-group trust, so that the effect on generalized trust is ambiguous. Also, while the relationship between civil conflict and group membership is a robust finding of the literature, it is unclear how this relationship should be interpreted. We make several hypotheses in this paper:

- Experience of civil conflict has negative effect on trust towards formal institutions (H6) and on perceived efficiency of formal institutions (H7)

- Experience of civil conflict has an ambiguous effect on generalized trust. (H8)

- Experience of civil conflict is associated with more active participation in groups and civic associations. (H9)

- More active participation in groups and civic associations following a civil conflict reflects bonding rather than bridging social capital. (H10)

3. Historical background: wars in Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia

3.1. World War II

A full description of World War II (WWII) and the destruction it caused in all but 3 of the 35 European and Central Asian countries included in LITS is well beyond the scope of this paper. The nature of World War II was very different in the different countries. In some countries, which side they were on was very clear from the onset. This is the case for the Axis powers: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Kosovo, Montenegro, Romania, Slovak Republic; and the Allies: Britain, the Czech Republic, Poland and most of the USSR. However, other countries were divided and switched sides over the course of the war. This was the case of Belarus, France, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova Serbia, Slovenia and Ukraine. I retain these three groupings of countries in the analysis. Hypothesis related to the effect of losing an international conflict are tested on the sample of the defeated Axis powers, those related to winning an international conflict on the sample of the victorious Allies. In the third group of divided countries, the experience of WWII is likened to a civil rather than international conflict. A fourth group of countries included in LITS: Sweden, Mongolia and Turkey remained neutral for all or the vast majority of the conflict and are excluded from the analysis.

3.2. Civil wars

Much civil conflict has occurred in the region since the end of WWII. They are described –only succinctly below.

3.2.1. The Yugoslav Wars

The Yugoslav Wars were fought in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995. Three separate but related wars can be considered: the War in Slovenia (1991), the Croatian War of independence (1991-1995) and the Bosnian War (1992-1995). They have all been characterized by bitter ethnic conflict among, on one side, Serbs (and Montenegrins) and, on the other, Croats and Bosnians (and to a lesser degree, Slovenes); but also between Bosnians and Croats in Bosnia. They have often been described as Europe's deadliest conflict since World War II and, according to the International Center for Transitional Justice, they resulted in the deaths of 140,000 people.

3.2.2. Kosovo

The Kosovo War consists of two separate armed conflicts in Kosovo. From early 1998 to 1999, the war was between the Serbian army and police of the Former Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Liberation Army. From March 24, 1999 to June 10, 1999, NATO attacked Serb military targets in Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo and ethnic Albanian militants continued battles with Yugoslav forces, amidst a massive displacement of population in Kosovo.[4] In June 1999, Milosevic capitulated and accepted peace conditions. Although the actual casualties of the war remain in debate, it is estimated that around 13,000 civilians lost their lives.

[4] estimated to be close to 1 million people.

3.2.3. The Tajik civil war

The Tajik civil war (1992-1997) has received far less attention than most other conflict of the 1990s. There appears to be no clear consensus on what caused the conflict and the literature offers a variety of different interpretations based on regionalism, ideology, elite instrumentalism, and resource-driven theories. From a regional perspective, the war is often described as a struggle between a pro-government alliance of northern and southern factions against eastern opposition groups, out of which the southern faction emerged as dominant. Ideologically, the conflict is often characterized as former communists against a highly fractionalized group of challengers comprised of Islamic revivalists, ethnic nationalists, and pro-democratic reformers. Most of the conflict took place in central and southern low-lying areas where these population groups were inter-mixed. From 1992 onward, the southern-dominated government forces battled eastern opposition groups until a peace agreement was reached in 1997. With military intervention from Russia and Uzbekistan, government forces ultimately regained control by pushing eastern opposition out of the south, the central regions, and the capital back to their homelands in the east or abroad. In 1997 the United Nations brokered a peace agreement between government and opposition forces. In the period between 1992 and 1997 estimates of war casualties vary between 50,000 and 100,000 dead and over 1 million people displaced internally and abroad.

3.2.4. The North Caucasus

Three years after Chechnya declared independence from Russia in 1991, Moscow authorities launched the first Chechen War that ended in the defeat of Russian forces in 1996. In 1999, the Second Chechen War was launched by the Russian Federation in response to the invasion of Dagestan by the Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade. Russia established direct rule of Chechnya in May 2000 but Chechen militant resistance throughout the North

Caucasus continued to challenge Russian political control over Chechnya. Chechen separatists also carried out terrorist attacks against civilians in Russia.[5] On 16 April 2009, the conflict officially ended. Unofficial estimates of its death toll range from 25,000 to 50,000 dead or missing civilians in Chechnya. Russian casualties are over 5,200 (official Russian casualty figures). Battle deaths are estimated around 30,000 (Correlates of War database).

3.2.5. Clashes in Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan experiences a series of riots and demonstrations in April 2010 that led to the ousting of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Protesters took control of a government office in Talas on April 6, and on April 7, clashes between protesters and police in the capital Bishkek turned violent. After the riots, President Bakiyev fled the capital and then the country and resigned as president, while opposition leaders formed a new government led by former foreign minister Roza Otunbayeva. Some clashes occurred in the South, the base of the former President.

4. Data and empirical strategy

4.1. Data

The LITS is a nationally representative survey. It was conducted in the summer of 2010 in 35 countries. All countries from the former Socialist bloc are included in the survey are as well as Turkey and five European countries for comparison: France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Sweden.

[5] The most notorious were the deadly 2004 siege at a school in Beslan, North Ossetia; the mid-air destruction of two Russian airliners; the bombings at two Moscow metro stations; and the mass hostage-taking at a Moscow theatre in October 2002.

Respondents to the survey were drawn randomly, using a two stage sampling method, with census enumeration areas as Primary Sampling Units (PSUs)[6], and households as secondary sampling units. This nationally representative survey includes 1,000 observations per country, except in Ukraine and Russia, where 1,500 individuals were surveyed. The total number of observation is more than 39,500.

4.2. Dependent variables: state capacity and social capital

State capacity refers to the state's ability to implement a range of policies, from raising revenue to enforcing contracts and supporting markets (Besley and Persson 2009). Key ingredients of state capacity are the legitimacy and the effectiveness of institutions. Legitimacy is measured in this paper by respondents' declared trust in different state institutions. LITS asks: "*On a scale of 1 (complete distrust) to 5 (complete trust), to what extent do you trust the following institutions*". Of particular interest is trust in central institutions, which sums responses to the question on trust in: the presidency, the government and the parliament. This "trust in central institutions" variable takes values from 3 (complete distrust in the three institutions) to 15 (complete trust in the three institutions). The average across the sample (unweighted average) is 8.27. It is lowest in Romania (5.05) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (6.66) and highest in Sweden and Central Asian countries (more than 10).

State capacity involves the ability of institutions to enforce contracts and support a market system (Besley and Person 2009). To this end, the effectiveness of the justice system in treating all citizens equally and protecting citizens against abuse by the state is of primary importance. LITS asks to what extent respondents agree that: (i) "*a courts system that treat all citizens*

[6] PSUs were selected randomly, with probability proportional to size.

equally, rather than favoring some over others" and (ii) *"a courts system that defends individual rights against abuses by the state"* exist in their country. Answers are on a scale from 1 ("strongly disagree") to 5 ("strongly agree"). I use the average of responses to these two questions as the main measure of institutions effectiveness (variable: "institutions effectiveness"). The average across the sample (unweighted average) is 2.78. It is lowest in Ukraine (2.03) and highest in Germany and Britain (3.62 and 3.39 respectively).

The first measure of social capital consists in answers to the widely used generalized trust question: "*Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful dealing with people*", with responses on a 5 point scale, from "complete distrust" to "complete trust". Generalized trust is lowest in Armenia (2.16) and highest in Sweden, Albania and Kazakhstan.

Social capital is also measured by group membership and participation in collective action, such as demonstrating, signing a petition or participating in a strike. LITS asks about membership in diverse groups: religious groups, recreational organizations, educational organizations, labor unions, environmental organizations, professional associates, charitable organizations or youth associations and whether the respondent is an active or inactive member. The variable "active participation in groups" is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the respondent is an active member of any such group. About 18%[7] of the sample is an active member of a group. Active group participation is lowest in Armenia and Azerbaijan and highest in Slovenia. The variable "political party membership" takes value one if the respondent declares being a current member of a political party. Only 7% of the (unweighted sample) belongs to a political party, ranging from a low of less than 1% in Poland to a high of 24% in Mongolia.

[7] unweighted average.

The variable "collective action" sums responses to questions related to whether the respondent participated in a demonstration or a strike or signed of a petition. Answers take values from 0 if the respondent "would never do" such an action, 1 if she "might do" and 2 if she "has done" in the past. "Collective action" thus takes values from 0 if the respondent would never do any of these actions to 3 if she has done all three. It is lowest in Azerbaijan (0.25) and Belarus (0.60) and highest in Croatia, Slovenia and Kosovo (2.77). Such measures of group participation and collective action are not only useful as additional measures of social capital but they also enable to test whether recent findings in the micro empirical literature on conflict that exposure to violence reinforces collective action, hold in our sample.

4.3. Independent variables: conflict exposure

4.3.1. LITS questions and descriptive statistics

Not many of 2010 respondents would report direct personal exposure to World War II, a conflict that ended more than 60 years ago. The survey therefore asks about personal and family exposure to violence during World War II with the following question: "*Were you, your parents or your grandparents physically injured or killed during the Second World War?"*. The variable "killed or injured in WWII" takes value one if the respondent answers yes to this question. Incidence of WWII exposure is high. Descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 1. On average, nearly 30% of respondents declare personal or family injury or loss during World War II (unweighted average across the sample). Such sample averages however hide considerable disparities across countries. The highest incidence of WWII victimization is in Belarus (64%), the Russian Federation and Ukraine (61%). The lowest is in Albania (7.2%) and Kosovo (9.7%). In the rest of the analysis, the variable "WWI won" (respectively "WWI lost) takes value one if the respondent answers yes to the above question in one of the countries listed in Section 3.1. as part

of the Allies (respectively, Axis). The variable "WWI divided" takes value one if respondents answer yes to the above question in one of the countries listed as divided in Section 3.1.

Questions on exposure to post World War II civil conflict are only asked in a subset of relevant countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Montenegro, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovenia and Tajikistan for recent civil wars and clashes. On average, 9.1% of the subsample answer yes to either the question "*Were you or any of your household members physically injured as a result of conflict in [country] from [date] to [date]"* or to a similar question inquiring about loss of life instead of physical injuries. Again, such an average hides considerable heterogeneity, with highest headcounts of victims in Bosnia and Herzegovina (27.5%) and Kosovo (18.7%) and lower headcounts in Macedonia (2.5%) and Kyrgyzstan (2.7%). In what follows, the variable "civil war" takes value one if the respondent answers yes to this question.

4.3.2. Reliability of survey responses on victimization

One may raise doubts on the validity of self-reported exposure to victimization. In order to gauge the reliability of LITS answers, I compare LITS data to secondary sources on victim counts. The first useful source of data is the correlates of war (COW) database, which counts battle-related combatant fatalities in intra and inter-state conflict. Such data is not the ideal comparison for LITS, since LITS also include civilian victims. For World War II, data on civilian deaths from the League of Nations Yearbook 1942-1944 is used in addition to COW data. I use Maddison data on population in 1945 and population growth rates between 1945 and 2010 in order to compute battle deaths and civilian deaths equivalent in proportion of contemporary populations. I use the average household size from LITS to compute what proportion of households such figures would correspond to. The correlation between the equivalent of

contemporary deaths as a proportion of households and data on victimization from World War II from LITS is more than 0.9.

I proceed in the same way for more recent conflict. A lot of data is missing in the COW database for recent conflict, namely for the Tajik conflict and the recent war between Georgia and Russia. In these cases I use alternative web sources. I find again, that the correlation between LITS data and secondary sources of data on civilian and battle deaths is very high, at 0.80.

5. Empirical strategy

5.1. Model specification and identification

I investigate how war experience affects individual trust in institutions, generalized trust and propensity to participate in collective action. War experience may affect individual beliefs, values and preferences and also give rise to new social norms, which manifest themselves at the country level. I also argue that different types of conflict may have different effects. The first step of the analysis is thus to explore cross-country variation in the effects of different conflict: won international wars, lost international wars and civil conflict. The general form of the cross-country estimation equation is as follows:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 W_{ij}^{k} + \beta_2 X_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij} \qquad (1)$$

Where W_{ij}^{k} is a dummy variable that captures the exposure to violence in a conflict of type *k* of individual *i* in country *j*. *k* denotes either an international conflict won, lost, or a civil conflict. X_{ij} is a set of individual and household controls. The dependent variables are the measures of state capacity and social capital described in section 4.2. ε_{ij} is the error term.

A cross-country approach is useful in order to shed light on the legacy of conflict at the national level. However, such an analysis, as noted above, is rife with omitted variable and

reverse causality biases. The legitimacy of institutions may be both an outcome of conflict and a predictor of conflict, as noted by Djankov and Reynal-Querol (2010). Admittedly, the analysis in this paper goes one step further since it does not simply considers the occurrence of conflict but also the outcome of conflict. The causal effect of conflict on institution legitimacy could still be identified even if legitimacy was endogenous to conflict occurrence, as long as, conditional on the occurrence of conflict, it is not endogenous to conflict outcome. Still, this might be a strong assumption and in order to overcome omitted variable and reverse causality issues that operate at the national level, the second step of the analysis explores within-country variation and compares individuals within country.

The general form of the within-country estimation equation is as follows:

$$Y_{ij} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 W_{ij}^{k} + \gamma_2 X_{ij} + \gamma_3 C_j + \zeta_{ij} \qquad (2)$$

where *Cj* are a set of country dummies and all other variables are as in (1).

In order to study the implications of collective action for state-building, the analysis also considers the following regression, which regresses legitimacy of institutions and general trust on collective action interacted with war victimization:

$$Trust_{ij} = \theta_0 + \theta_1 W_{ij}^{k} + \theta_2 CollAction_{ij} + \theta_3 W_{ij}^{k} * CollAction_{ij} + \theta_4 X_{ij} + \theta_5 C_j + \xi_{ij} \qquad (3)$$

Cross and within country variation is explored in turn.

Identification of the causal effects of conflict requires that victimization is random. Such an assumption might be too strong. Victims of violence may be different from non-victims in observable and unobservable ways and so any comparisons of victims and non-victims will conflate the impacts of war with preexisting differences that led some people to be victimized. This is especially problematic if the characteristics associated with victimization are also those associated with the outcomes that we want to observe, such as social and political preferences. In

the case of World War II, for example, communists may have been systematically targeted, and such characteristics might be correlated with social and political attitudes even today. This would result in a bias in the estimation of victimization on social and political attitudes.

Attenuating our concerns about selection, in particular for World War II, is that, since it ended 65 years before LITS was conducted, selection would have operated at the parents' or grandparents' level and might thus be less of a concern (depending on the strength of transmission of political values). Still, some concerns remain for the identification of causal effects of victimization and we employ several strategies to deal with the potential selection bias.

First, I employ a selection on observables strategy and check that the results are robust to the inclusion of a large number of individual and household controls. Of particular concern are variables that may be related both to post war outcomes and to victimization. I first include invariant characteristics, which cannot be affected by victimization but may be correlated with it, such as age, gender or ethnicity. Ethnicity is very well measured in LITS, which asks not about self declared ethnicity, which could be an endogenous measure, but rather about the respondent's mother tongue, as well as her father's and her mother's mother tongue. I also empirically investigate what characteristics are associated with victimization and include them as controls in the rest of our analysis (see next subsection). In particular, all regressions control for Communist Party membership of the respondent, the respondents' parents of "other member of the family" and for religion.

Second, in the within-country analysis, I check that all results are robust to the inclusion of village fixed effects. The use of village fixed effects implies that identification now only requires that violence is -close to- random within villages, conditional on household and individual characteristics.

War induced migration could confound the results, since victimization is often associated with displacement. I undertake two strategies to address this issue in robustness tests. First, I control for migration. Second, I follow Bellows and Miguel (2009) and Cassar, Grosjean, and Whitt (2013a) and I restrict the analysis to people who have never moved or been displaced, and whose family (parents, grandparents) has never been displaced. Fortunately, LITS data asks whether respondents or their parents or grandparents were displaced as a result of conflict. 15% of respondents answer that their family has been displaced as a result of WWII. 7% of respondents were displaced as a result of a civil conflict. LITS also asks for how long respondents have lived in the locality in which they are surveyed in 2010. Keeping only respondents who have never moved and do not have a family history of war-related displacement leaves about 45% of the original sample. This distinction enables me to alleviate concerns related to self-selective migration, which would confound the results if, for example, displacement itself eroded social capital or if war victims systematically sorted themselves in low social capital areas. It also enables me to investigate the potential differential effect of victimization as a function of displacement. One the one hand, the combined traumas of victimization and displacement may lead to stronger results for displaced people. On the other hand, if people did not have the possibility to move and still live among the perpetrators of civil war related violence, the effects may be stronger for non-movers.

In all regressions including country or village fixed effects, standard errors are clustered at the country level.

5.2. Determinants of victimization

Table 3 displays the result where victimization indicators are regressed on a number of individual and household level characteristics. Columns 1 to 4 study the determinants of

victimization during the Second World War, Columns 5 to 8 during recent civil conflict. Cross-country and within country variation are explored in turn. Ethnicity is proxied by the respondent's mother tongue. There are more than 37 possible languages, so the results specific to each possible category are omitted. No ethnicity, apart from Laz, is robustly associated with World War II victimization. For recent civil conflict, Bosnian, Croat, Georgian and Tajik ethnicity are positively associated with victimization both across and within countries. Religion is not robustly associated with victimization. Education is negatively and significantly associated with victimization in recent civil conflict. Income and age are not significantly associated with victimization during recent conflict, but is positively associated with victimization in World War II. Communist party membership is positively and significantly associated with victimization, both during World War II and during recent conflict. All regressions that follow control for communist party membership of any household member.

6. Results

6.1. War and state capacity: legitimacy and effectiveness of institutions

Table 4 presents the coefficients of separate regressions in which the outcome variables are measures of state capacity. For each measure, the first column presents the results of cross-country regressions, the second presents the results of within-country regressions (controlling for country dummies) and the third includes village or suburb dummies. The main independent variable of interest is victimization. A distinction is made between victimization in WWII in countries that were victorious, victimization in WWII in countries that were defeated and victimization in a civil war. I also investigate separately the effect of victimization during World War II in countries that were divided. The results for this subsample are presented first individually and then grouped together with victimization during a recent civil war.

The first measure of state capacity is the perceived legitimacy of central institutions, which sums the trust in presidency, government and parliament. Civil conflict, including WWII experience in divided countries, is associated with much lower trust in central institutions. This negative relationship between civil war victimization and perceived legitimacy of central institutions is robust to the inclusion of country and village fixed effects. The effect is quantitatively meaningful. Trust in central institutions among victims of civil conflict is more than 8% lower than among non victims and 3.5 to 4% lower than among non victims in the same country or in the same village, that is to say for a given quality of formal institutions.

The influence of international conflict depends crucially on the outcome of the conflict. The legitimacy of central institutions is higher in countries that won WWII compared to other countries, and particularly those that lost WWII; a result seemingly consistent with the state-building model. However, turning to within-country results, the relationship between victimization and legitimacy turns out to be negative, regardless of the outcome of the war. Even conditional on the country having won an international conflict, those who experienced personal loss of life or injury on their family still trust central institutions less.

Individual results for each institution are identical in terms of sign and statistical significance of coefficient.[8] The effect is generally strongest for presidency.

The second measure of state capacity is the perceived effectiveness of the court systems in defending individual rights against abuse by the state and in treating all citizens equally. The results are identical to those pertaining to legitimacy and the magnitude of the effect is of a similar order of magnitude. In countries that were victorious in WWII, perceived effectiveness is higher compared to other countries, but the effect is no longer significant when country fixed

[8] The results are not displayed here for economy of space.

effects are included. Civil conflict and lost international conflict are associated with lower perceived effectiveness. Within countries, the effect is negative regardless of the outcome of the war or the nature of the war.

All results obtained for civil conflict, including WWII in divided countries, are robust and similar in magnitude when controlling for migration and when restricting the sample to those who have never moved. Results pertaining to victimization in WWII in countries that lost are robust to controlling for migration and are robust in the subsample of non-movers for institutions perceived effectiveness. Results pertaining to victimization in WWII in countries that were victorious fall short of statistical significance when country or village fixed effects are included. Results on the sample of non-migrants are in Online Appendix Table A1.

Overall, personal experiences of conflict are overwhelmingly associated with negative and persistent effects on perceived legitimacy and effectiveness of institutions. Within country, we are able to reject H1, H2 and H3: even among countries that were victorious in WWII, personal experiences of victimization have a non-positive legacy in trust and legitimacy of institutions. We are unable to reject H6 and H7: the legacy of civil conflict, including, 65 years later, that of WWII in countries that were divided, is negative.

6.2. War and social capital

Table 5 presents the coefficients of separate regressions where the outcome variables are measures of generalized trust and social capital. As in what precedes, for each measure, the first column presents the results of cross-country regressions, the second presents the results of within country regressions, controlling for country dummies and the third includes village dummies.

There is no robust and consistent relationship between any type of conflict victimization and generalized trust. We are unable to reject H8 but able to reject H4.

By contrast, the relationship between civil conflict victimization and participation in groups and association is robust and large in magnitude. We are unable to reject H9: victims of a civil conflict are more than 16% more likely to be active members of a civic association compared to non-victims in the same country or the same village. The same result is found in the case of lost international conflict and is even larger in magnitude. Results are robust to the inclusion of country and village dummies. More surprisingly, within country, and even within village, participation in groups and associations is also much higher among people who were victimized during an international conflict that ended in victory.

All the results are robust to controlling for migration or restricting the sample to those who have never moved. Results on the sample of non-migrants are in Online Appendix Table A2. Results for membership to political parties are also robust but not displayed for economy of space.

In sum, participation in groups and collective action is systematically and substantially higher among victims of any type of war-related violence. This echoes an emerging and seemingly robust finding in the literature. Bellows and Miguel (2009) and Blattman (2009), for example, find, in the case of, respectively, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Tajikistan that civil conflict victimization reinforces local collective action, political engagement and voting. These findings have led researchers to be optimistic about the consequences of conflict for building social capital and reinforcing state capacity (Blattman 2009). However, such optimism is hardly consistent with the results of the preceding subsection, which point to negative and persistent effects of personal experiences of conflict on perceived legitimacy and effectiveness of institutions. In order to shed more light on this issue, the next subsection investigates in more details the relationship between victimization, collective action and state capacity.

6.3. From local collective action to social capital and state capacity?

Table 6 reports the coefficients of separate regressions where measures of state capacity and of generalized trust are regressed on an interaction between victimization and active participation in groups. As in what precedes, for each measure, the first column presents the results of cross-country regressions, the second presents the results of within country regressions, controlling for country dummies and the third includes village or suburb dummies.

The first variable of interest is the dummy that reflects whether people actively participate in groups or association. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on this variable reflects the usual result of the literature that group participation is correlated with higher levels of trust. The second variable of interest is the dummy that indicates group participation and the victimization proxy. The coefficient of this interaction term is negative and statistically significant in the case of civil war victimization when within-country variation is considered. This indicates that the victims of civil violence who participate in groups are less trusting of central institutions. For social trust, the coefficient is also negative but falls short of significance. In the case of a lost international conflict, the interaction between group participation and victimization is significant and negatively correlated with generalized trust.

These results should be interpreted with caution, because of the possible endogeneity between group membership and social and political preferences. It is possible that the presence of unobserved individual heterogeneity drives some of the results. Based on the comparison of coefficients with and without the set of individual controls, Altonji et al. (2005) develop a methodology to assess how much larger the influence of unobservable factors compared to observables would need to be to explain away the full effect. It would need to be more than 10 times as large in order to explain the negative relationship between victimization in a civil conflict, group membership and political trust. When the dependent variable is generalized trust,

the coefficient on the interaction between victimization in countries that were defeated in WWII and group membership becomes larger when individual controls are included, suggesting that if selection is at play, it actually biases the results in my favor.[9]

Results relative to civil conflict are generally not robust to controlling for migration or restricting the sample to non-migrants, but those related to victimization in WWII are. In particular, the results relative to the negative association between, on the one hand, victimization in WWII in countries that lost and participation in groups and, on the other hand, generalized trust and trust in formal institutions are stronger and more statistically significant. Results on the sample of non-migrants are in Online Appendix Table A3.

To sum up, civil war and losing an international conflict stimulate collective action, but of a nature that is associated with a further erosion of trust in central institutions and also with lower social trust, in the case of lost international. The effects are also negative for victimization in a victorious international conflict but are not statistically significant. Overall, we are unable to reject H10 but able to reject H5. The interpretation of these results is that the type of collective action that is associated with victimization civil war is unlikely to be associated with state-building and inclusive social capital. The interpretation is that conflict experience may foster bonding social capital, but erode bridging social capital. This echoes recent findings by Satyanath, Voigtlaender, and Voth (2013) on the "dark side of social capital" in Germany. The authors find that dense networks of civic associations facilitated the rise of the Nazi Party.

7. Conclusion

[9] The results of regressions without any individual controls are not displayed for economy of space but are available upon request.

This paper uses new evidence from a large-scale nationally representative survey conducted in 35 countries in Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia and sheds light on how the experience of conflict shapes political and social preferences. The investigation covers World War II and recent international conflict in the Caucasus. Also studied are the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia, in Tajikistan and in the North Caucasus. The focus is on the legacy of conflict on trust in institutions and their legitimacy, which are important determinants of state capacity, and on social capital, which has been associated with the development of successful market economies and political democracies.

Both the nature and the outcome of the conflict are found to be crucial in determining its legacy. International conflict is associated with survey responses towards higher legitimacy of national institutions in countries that were victorious -consistent with the state capacity model; but the effect is not robust within countries. In contrast, civil conflict and being on the losing side of an international war are associated with lower perceived legitimacy and effectiveness of national institutions- a result consistent with the conflict trap model and that is robust within country. The paper also finds that conflict spurs collective action. Again, the nature of such action depends on the nature of the conflict. Civil war and losing an international conflict lead to collective action that is associated with further erosion of institutional and social trust.

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Tables

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics Victimization

	Killed or injured in recent civil war		Killed or injured WWII	
	mean	sd	mean	sd
Albania (ii)			0.072	0.259
Armenia (i)	0.071	0.257	0.376	0.485
Azerbaijan (i)			0.360	0.480
Belarus (iii)			0.640	0.480
Bosnia and Herzegovina (ii)	0.275	0.447	0.208	0.406
Britain (i)			0.158	0.365
Bulgaria (ii)			0.146	0.353
Croatia (ii)	0.147	0.354	0.333	0.472
Czech Republic (ii)			0.112	0.315
Estonia (iii)			0.370	0.483
France (iii)			0.246	0.431
Georgia (i)			0.380	0.486
Germany (ii)			0.291	0.454
Hungary (ii)			0.212	0.409
Italy (ii)			0.142	0.349
Kazakhstan (i)			0.515	0.500
Kosovo (ii)	0.187	0.390	0.097	0.296
Kyrgyzstan (i)	0.027	0.161	0.300	0.458
Latvia (iii)			0.403	0.491
Lithuania (iii)			0.198	0.399
Macedonia* (ii)	0.025	0.157	0.143	0.351
Moldova (iii)			0.432	0.496
Montenegro (ii)	0.058	0.235	0.277	0.448
Poland (i)			0.332	0.471
Romania (ii)			0.270	0.444
Russian Federation (i)	0.042	0.202	0.610	0.488
Serbia (iii)	0.072	0.258	0.339	0.474
Slovak Republic (ii)			0.130	0.336
Slovenia (iii)	0.029	0.167	0.188	0.391
Tajikistan* (i)	0.078	0.269	0.191	0.393
Ukraine (iii)			0.606	0.489
Uzbekistan (i)			0.227	0.419
Whole sample	0.085	0.279	0.297	0.457
Observations	14682		32256	

Notes: (i): World War II, won; (ii): World War II, lost; (iii): World War II, divided.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Outcome Variables
Panel A: Legitimacy of institutions

	Trust in central institutions (min: 3, max: 15)		Institutions perceived effectiveness (min: 1; max: 5)	
	mean	sd	mean	sd
Albania	8.10	2.80	2.69	1.05
Armenia	7.63	3.84	2.43	1.10
Azerbaijan	11.22	3.04	3.10	1.09
Belarus	10.17	3.36	3.11	1.03
Bosnia and Herzegovina	6.66	3.10	2.64	0.98
Britain	8.24	2.68	3.39	0.95
Bulgaria	7.25	2.80	2.24	0.96
Croatia	6.98	2.41	2.47	1.11
Czech Republic	8.09	2.54	2.78	1.02
Estonia	9.35	2.93	3.17	1.04
France	7.39	2.91	3.12	1.16
Georgia	9.73	2.66	2.86	0.93
Germany	8.93	2.82	3.62	0.97
Hungary	8.91	3.28	2.76	1.16
Italy	7.59	2.76	2.97	1.22
Kazakhstan	11.06	2.99	2.75	1.09
Kosovo	7.54	3.51	2.64	1.17
Kyrgyzstan	7.38	2.96	2.20	0.95
Latvia	6.79	2.60	2.43	0.95
Lithuania	7.79	2.24	2.36	0.98
Macedonia	7.28	3.53	2.27	1.03
Moldova	6.97	3.46	2.66	1.13
Montenegro	9.44	3.10	3.09	0.95
Poland	8.62	2.77	3.09	0.97
Romania	5.01	2.74	2.39	1.07
Russian Federation	9.09	3.45	2.41	1.05
Serbia	6.85	2.94	2.49	1.02
Slovak Republic	7.98	2.43	2.72	1.02
Slovenia	7.39	2.84	2.69	1.05
Tajikistan	12.91	2.34	3.43	0.99
Ukraine	7.06	3.41	2.03	0.95
Uzbekistan			3.99	0.97
Whole sample	8.160	3.330	2.790	1.130
Observations	31657		32592	

Panel B: Social Capital

	Generalized trust (min:1, max: 5)		Active participation in a group (min: 0, max: 1)		Membership political party (min: 0, max: 1)		Collective action (min: 0, max: 6)	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd
Albania	3.29	0.91	0.07	0.26	0.11	0.31	1.30	1.47
Armenia	2.17	0.96	0.02	0.15	0.12	0.33	0.68	1.26
Azerbaijan	2.40	1.27	0.02	0.16	0.11	0.31	0.25	0.73
Belarus	3.12	1.00	0.18	0.38	0.01	0.11	0.60	1.08
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3.03	0.96	0.16	0.37	0.12	0.32	1.82	1.66
Britain	3.14	1.01	0.40	0.49	0.03	0.16	2.41	1.53
Bulgaria	2.88	0.96	0.05	0.23	0.03	0.17	1.49	1.69
Croatia	2.87	0.99	0.22	0.41	0.08	0.27	2.25	1.76
Czech Republic	2.83	0.91	0.17	0.38	0.03	0.18	2.35	1.55
Estonia	3.14	1.03	0.18	0.38	0.03	0.17	1.20	1.43
France	2.78	1.04	0.40	0.49	0.02	0.15	3.62	1.95
Georgia	2.83	0.96	0.11	0.32	0.02	0.12	0.54	1.17
Germany	2.93	0.90	0.32	0.47	0.04	0.20	2.39	1.72
Hungary	2.86	1.01	0.12	0.32	0.01	0.09	0.93	1.49
Italy	2.79	0.95	0.21	0.41	0.02	0.15	2.55	1.87
Kazakhstan	3.34	1.03	0.06	0.24	0.05	0.21	0.51	0.96
Kosovo	3.17	0.95	0.09	0.29	0.12	0.32	2.77	1.46
Kyrgyzstan	2.65	1.07	0.07	0.26	0.10	0.30	0.66	1.15
Latvia	2.69	1.01	0.11	0.31	0.02	0.13	1.68	1.51
Lithuania	2.81	0.90	0.14	0.35	0.03	0.17	1.77	1.60
Macedonia	2.57	1.08	0.12	0.32	0.16	0.37	2.14	1.89
Moldova	2.97	1.09	0.18	0.39	0.04	0.19	0.86	1.37
Montenegro	3.18	0.86	0.13	0.33	0.10	0.29	1.62	1.64
Poland	3.09	0.91	0.25	0.43	0.00	0.07	1.49	1.52
Romania	2.67	1.07	0.23	0.42	0.03	0.17	1.29	1.57
Russian Federation	3.23	1.15	0.05	0.21	0.02	0.14	0.87	1.25
Serbia	3.05	0.98	0.14	0.35	0.10	0.30	1.86	1.81
Slovak Republic	2.75	0.91	0.12	0.33	0.02	0.15	2.53	1.62
Slovenia	3.02	0.90	0.33	0.47	0.04	0.20	2.32	1.65
Tajikistan	3.24	1.15	0.11	0.31	0.04	0.20	0.47	0.98
Ukraine	3.21	1.04	0.11	0.31	0.05	0.22	1.17	1.38
Uzbekistan	3.17	1.18	0.05	0.21	0.02	0.13		
Whole sample	2.950	1.045	0.155	0.362	0.052	0.223	1.562	1.701
Observations	34159		35960		35557		34425	

Table 3: Determinants of Victimization

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Victimization WWII (mean: 0.297)				Victimization recent civil conflict (mean: 0.035)			
age	0.004***	0.004***	0.005***	0.005***	0.001	0.001	0.001**	0.001**
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
age squared	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000*	-0.000*	-0.000**	-0.000**
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Buddhist	-0.016	-0.015	-0.015	-0.014	0.012	0.012	0.009	0.009
	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.014]	[0.014]	[0.011]	[0.011]
Jewish	0.051	0.058	0.056	0.062	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	0.000
	[0.084]	[0.085]	[0.085]	[0.085]	[0.020]	[0.019]	[0.020]	[0.020]
Orthodox	0.037*	0.037*	0.018	0.018	-0.006	-0.006	-0.010*	-0.010*
	[0.021]	[0.021]	[0.020]	[0.020]	[0.005]	[0.005]	[0.005]	[0.005]
Catholic	-0.030	-0.026	-0.023	-0.019	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.003
	[0.022]	[0.021]	[0.022]	[0.021]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.003]
Other Christian	-0.013	-0.011	-0.007	-0.005	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.004
	[0.026]	[0.025]	[0.026]	[0.025]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]
Muslim	-0.033	-0.029	-0.058**	-0.055**	0.011	0.011	-0.017*	-0.016
	[0.029]	[0.030]	[0.026]	[0.026]	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.010]	[0.010]
Other	-0.020	-0.019	-0.008	-0.007	-0.004	-0.004	-0.001	-0.000
	[0.029]	[0.029]	[0.029]	[0.029]	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]
work	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.003	-0.003
	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.002]
primary edu	-0.024	-0.024	-0.026	-0.026	-0.039**	-0.039**	-0.024*	-0.024*
	[0.020]	[0.020]	[0.020]	[0.021]	[0.019]	[0.019]	[0.013]	[0.013]
lower sec edu	-0.023	-0.024	-0.029	-0.029	-0.038*	-0.038*	-0.025*	-0.025*
	[0.022]	[0.022]	[0.023]	[0.023]	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.014]	[0.014]
higher sec edu	-0.031	-0.032	-0.037	-0.037	-0.041**	-0.041**	-0.027**	-0.027**
	[0.022]	[0.022]	[0.022]	[0.023]	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.012]	[0.012]
post-sec edu	-0.021	-0.022	-0.035	-0.036	-0.036**	-0.035**	-0.025**	-0.025**
	[0.021]	[0.021]	[0.022]	[0.022]	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.012]	[0.012]
BA	-0.025	-0.026	-0.032	-0.032	-0.041*	-0.041*	-0.026*	-0.026*
	[0.023]	[0.023]	[0.024]	[0.024]	[0.020]	[0.020]	[0.015]	[0.014]
MA or PhD	0.006	0.001	-0.011	-0.015	-0.040**	-0.040**	-0.026*	-0.027*
	[0.028]	[0.028]	[0.030]	[0.030]	[0.019]	[0.019]	[0.014]	[0.014]
HH size	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.005**	0.005**	0.003**	0.003**
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.001]
mid income	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.006*	0.006*	0.005	0.005
	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]
rich	0.023**	0.022**	0.023**	0.022**	0.005	0.005	0.003	0.003
	[0.010]	[0.010]	[0.009]	[0.010]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]
resp. com. party	0.092***		0.095***		0.016**		0.017**	
	[0.013]		[0.013]		[0.007]		[0.007]	
father com. party	0.101***		0.099***		0.017***		0.017***	
	[0.011]		[0.011]		[0.006]		[0.006]	
mother com. party	0.022		0.023		-0.005		-0.003	
	[0.015]		[0.015]		[0.009]		[0.009]	
any HH com. party		0.116***		0.116***		0.015***		0.018***
		[0.010]		[0.009]		[0.005]		[0.005]
Ethnicity	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Country dummies	no	no	yes	yes	no	no	yes	yes
Observations	29,542	29,543	29,542	29,543	32,092	32,093	32,092	32,093
R-squared	0.137	0.139	0.145	0.146	0.093	0.093	0.121	0.121

Table 4: Conflict and State Capacity

	1	2	3	4	5	6
	Trust in central institutions (president, government and parliament)			Institutions' perceived effectiveness		
Victimization in:						
(i) Recent civil war	-1.141***	-0.449***	-0.298**	-0.272***	-0.195***	-0.092**
	[0.279]	[0.115]	[0.114]	[0.083]	[0.047]	[0.040]
(ii) WWII divided	-0.566	-0.306***	-0.307***	-0.233	-0.153***	-0.115***
	[0.396]	[0.095]	[0.053]	[0.137]	[0.040]	[0.020]
Civil war or WWII divided ((i) or (ii))	-0.715**	-0.357***	-0.299***	-0.250**	-0.168***	-0.109***
	[0.335]	[0.082]	[0.053]	[0.108]	[0.032]	[0.019]
(iii) WWII won	1.225***	-0.068	-0.229**	0.059	-0.037	-0.065***
	[0.346]	[0.099]	[0.094]	[0.106]	[0.042]	[0.016]
(iv) WWII lost	-0.575	-0.210***	-0.171**	-0.113	-0.166***	-0.115***
	[0.369]	[0.061]	[0.079]	[0.125]	[0.042]	[0.023]
Individual controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Country dummies	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Village dummies	no	no	yes	no	no	yes

Notes: Each cell reports either the coefficient or standard error (in brackets) of individual regressions controlling for the full set of individual controls: age, income, education, communist party membership of any household member, size of household, working status, religion. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***Significantly different from 0 at the 1% level, *significantly different from 0 at the 10% level. Number of observations: 29,000.

Table 5: Wars and Collective Action

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
	Generalized Trust			Active participation in groups			Membership political party			Collective action		
Victimization in:												
Recent civil war	0.118	-0.021	-0.088**	0.067**	0.048**	0.033**	0.068***	0.043***	0.044***	0.862***	0.324***	0.210***
	[0.083]	[0.046]	[0.040]	[0.028]	[0.022]	[0.014]	[0.013]	[0.012]	[0.014]	[0.215]	[0.083]	[0.060]
WWII divided	0.043	-0.061**	-0.024	0.009	0.013	0.012*	-0.008	0.005	0.006	0.065	0.207***	0.148***
	[0.076]	[0.027]	[0.032]	[0.022]	[0.010]	[0.007]	[0.013]	[0.006]	[0.006]	[0.181]	[0.026]	[0.034]
Civil war or WWII	0.061	-0.047*	-0.037	0.024	0.023**	0.019***	0.008	0.016**	0.017**	0.242	0.237***	0.166***
divided	[0.065]	[0.026]	[0.027]	[0.020]	[0.011]	[0.006]	[0.012]	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.167]	[0.033]	[0.031]
WWII win	-0.018	0.019	-0.008	-0.032	0.018**	0.013**	-0.008	0.013***	0.013***	-0.531***	0.155***	0.113***
	[0.101]	[0.024]	[0.022]	[0.021]	[0.007]	[0.005]	[0.013]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.160]	[0.055]	[0.026]
WWII lost	-0.050	-0.030	-0.033	0.058**	0.051***	0.024*	0.045***	0.026***	0.020***	0.568***	0.289***	0.186***
	[0.072]	[0.047]	[0.033]	[0.024]	[0.013]	[0.013]	[0.013]	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.156]	[0.062]	[0.039]
Individual controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Country dummies	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Village dummies	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes

Notes: Each cell reports either the coefficient or standard error (in brackets) of individual regressions controlling for the full set of individual controls: age, income, education, communist party membership of any household member, size of household, working status, religion. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***Significantly different from 0 at the 1% level, *significantly different from 0 at the 10% level. Number of observations: 29,000

Table 6: From Local Collective Action to State Capacity and Social Capital?

Dependent variable:	Trust in central institutions (president, government and parliament)		Generalized trust	
Recent civil war	0.144	0.359***	0.088**	0.062**
	[0.160]	[0.090]	[0.041]	[0.025]
Participation in groups	-1.029***	-0.314**	0.104	-0.046
	[0.268]	[0.150]	[0.092]	[0.056]
Recent civil war *part. in groups	**-0.539**	**-0.746****	**0.046**	**0.126**
	[0.404]	[0.301]	[0.168]	[0.143]
WWII divided	-0.580	-0.299***	0.063	-0.053*
	[0.417]	[0.092]	[0.082]	[0.027]
Participation in groups	0.118	0.328***	0.101**	0.065**
	[0.166]	[0.105]	[0.047]	[0.031]
WWII divided *part. in groups	**0.131**	**-0.003**	**-0.117***	**-0.044**
	[0.217]	[0.153]	[0.067]	[0.045]
WWII won	1.315***	-0.023	-0.023	0.024
	[0.351]	[0.109]	[0.113]	[0.027]
Participation in groups	0.200	0.342***	0.079*	0.062**
	[0.144]	[0.080]	[0.039]	[0.027]
WWII won*participation in groups	**-0.521**	**-0.250**	**0.068**	**-0.038**
	[0.347]	[0.305]	[0.112]	[0.054]
WWII lost	-0.584	-0.192**	-0.015	-0.006
	[0.360]	[0.078]	[0.064]	[0.035]
Participation in groups	0.138	0.338***	0.103**	0.070***
	[0.151]	[0.099]	[0.040]	[0.024]
WWII lost*participation in groups	**0.094**	**-0.094**	**-0.176***	**-0.150***
	[0.289]	[0.197]	[0.094]	[0.082]
Individual controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Country dummies	no	yes	no	yes

Notes: Each cell reports either the coefficient or standard error (in brackets) of individual regressions controlling for the full set of individual controls: age, income, education, communist party membership of any household member, size of household, working status, religion. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***Significantly different from 0 at the 1% level, *significantly different from 0 at the 10% level. Number of observations: 29,000.

APPENDIX (*for online publication only*)

Table A1: Replica of Table 4 controlling for migration / restricted to sample of non-movers

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Trust in central institutions (president, government and parliament)				Institutions' perceived effectiveness			
Victimization in:								
Recent civil war	-1.120***	-1.102**	-0.441***	-0.502**	-0.266***	-0.240*	-0.182***	-0.189**
	[0.281]	[0.438]	[0.116]	[0.215]	[0.083]	[0.119]	[0.045]	[0.092]
WWII divided	-0.545	-0.611	-0.298***	-0.384***	-0.229	-0.214	-0.145***	-0.132*
	[0.401]	[0.525]	[0.094]	[0.081]	[0.139]	[0.186]	[0.040]	[0.074]
Civil war or WWII divided	-0.698**	-0.720	-0.351***	-0.410***	-0.246**	-0.222	-0.159***	-0.146**
	[0.339]	[0.436]	[0.082]	[0.083]	[0.109]	[0.149]	[0.032]	[0.063]
WWII won	1.248***	1.295***	-0.057	0.037	0.065	0.122	-0.028	0.048
	[0.346]	[0.377]	[0.099]	[0.099]	[0.106]	[0.106]	[0.044]	[0.057]
WWII lost	-0.557	-0.317	-0.197***	0.027	-0.109	-0.175	-0.154***	-0.213***
	[0.369]	[0.369]	[0.062]	[0.112]	[0.126]	[0.120]	[0.040]	[0.076]
Individual controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Country dummies	no	no	yes	yes	no	no	yes	yes
Control for having moved	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
Sample	whole	non-movers	whole	non-movers	whole	non-movers	whole	non-movers

Notes: see notes to Table 4.

Table A2: Replica of Table 5 controlling for migration / restricted to sample of non-movers

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
	Generalized trust				Active participation in groups				Collective action			
Victimization in:												
Recent civil war	0.120	0.144	-0.013	0.056	0.062**	0.085**	0.043*	0.059*	0.845***	0.764***	0.314***	0.392***
	[0.083]	[0.096]	[0.047]	[0.084]	[0.030]	[0.036]	[0.023]	[0.029]	[0.213]	[0.183]	[0.082]	[0.113]
WWII divided	0.045	0.082	-0.057**	-0.106*	0.005	0.029	0.010	0.024	0.046	-0.042	0.201***	0.211***
	[0.076]	[0.087]	[0.027]	[0.053]	[0.023]	[0.023]	[0.010]	[0.018]	[0.176]	[0.199]	[0.026]	[0.040]
Civil war or WWII divided	0.063	0.093	-0.042	-0.067	0.019	0.041*	0.020*	0.034**	0.221	0.132	0.230***	0.263***
	[0.065]	[0.075]	[0.026]	[0.055]	[0.021]	[0.021]	[0.011]	[0.016]	[0.162]	[0.176]	[0.033]	[0.051]
WWII won	-0.016	-0.027	0.025	0.095**	-0.035	-0.032*	0.015**	0.019*	-0.548***	-0.511***	0.149**	0.205**
	[0.102]	[0.098]	[0.024]	[0.039]	[0.021]	[0.017]	[0.006]	[0.009]	[0.160]	[0.173]	[0.054]	[0.075]
WWII lost	-0.048	-0.065	-0.022	-0.037	0.055**	0.063**	0.046***	0.056**	0.555***	0.609***	0.281***	0.246**
	[0.072]	[0.080]	[0.048]	[0.055]	[0.024]	[0.028]	[0.014]	[0.022]	[0.160]	[0.165]	[0.064]	[0.117]
Individual controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Country dummies	no	no	yes	yes	no	no	yes	yes	no	no	yes	yes
Control for having moved	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
Sample	whole	non-movers	whole	non-movers	whole	non-movers	whole	non-movers	whole	non-movers	whole	non-movers

Notes: see notes to Table 5.

Table A3: Replica of Table 6 controlling for migration / restricted to sample of non-movers

Dependent variable:	Trust in central institutions (president, government and parliament)				Generalized trust			
Recent civil war	-1.006***	-0.993**	-0.305*	-0.434**	0.107	0.125	-0.037	0.021
	[0.268]	[0.453]	[0.151]	[0.205]	[0.092]	[0.104]	[0.057]	[0.092]
Participation in groups	0.149	0.178	0.360***	0.359***	0.088**	0.048	0.063**	0.009
	[0.158]	[0.180]	[0.090]	[0.114]	[0.041]	[0.047]	[0.025]	[0.038]
Recent civil war *part. in groups	**-0.548**	**-0.504**	**-0.748****	**-0.367**	**0.044**	**0.071**	**0.123**	**0.172**
	[0.400]	[0.421]	[0.301]	[0.307]	[0.167]	[0.206]	[0.143]	[0.193]
WWII divided	-0.559	-0.669	-0.291***	-0.444***	0.066	0.089	-0.048*	-0.110*
	[0.421]	[0.578]	[0.091]	[0.114]	[0.081]	[0.092]	[0.027]	[0.060]
Participation in groups	0.128	0.141	0.331***	0.317***	0.102**	0.055	0.067**	0.012
	[0.165]	[0.183]	[0.105]	[0.100]	[0.046]	[0.049]	[0.031]	[0.038]
WWII divided *part. in groups	**0.126**	**0.398**	**-0.006**	**0.380**	**-0.117***	**-0.049**	**-0.045**	**0.024**
	[0.218]	[0.502]	[0.152]	[0.370]	[0.067]	[0.110]	[0.045]	[0.102]
WWII won	1.337***	1.357***	-0.013	0.102	-0.022	-0.022	0.030	0.109***
	[0.352]	[0.388]	[0.111]	[0.087]	[0.114]	[0.103]	[0.027]	[0.030]
Participation in groups	0.215	0.226	0.345***	0.383***	0.080**	0.054	0.064**	0.022
	[0.142]	[0.179]	[0.079]	[0.118]	[0.038]	[0.044]	[0.027]	[0.038]
WWII won*participation in groups	**-0.520**	**-0.415**	**-0.250**	**-0.570****	**0.068**	**-0.037**	**-0.039**	**-0.132**
	[0.345]	[0.404]	[0.304]	[0.231]	[0.112]	[0.142]	[0.053]	[0.116]
WWII lost	-0.567	-0.223	-0.179**	0.113	-0.013	0.009	0.002	0.024
	[0.360]	[0.401]	[0.077]	[0.140]	[0.065]	[0.076]	[0.036]	[0.050]
Participation in groups	0.148	0.202	0.341***	0.379***	0.104**	0.081*	0.072***	0.037
	[0.149]	[0.181]	[0.098]	[0.118]	[0.040]	[0.045]	[0.024]	[0.036]
WWII lost*participation in groups	**0.090**	**-0.399**	**-0.093**	**-0.431***	**-0.177***	**-0.378*****	**-0.120**	**-0.303****
	[0.286]	[0.371]	[0.197]	[0.221]	[0.093]	[0.132]	[0.082]	[0.122]
Individual controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Control for migration	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
Country dummies	no	no	yes	yes	no	no	yes	yes
Sample	whole	non-movers	whole	non-movers	whole	non-movers	whole	non-movers

Notes: see notes to Table 6.