Network Externalities and Market Dominance∗

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April 10, 2018

Abstract

We develop a framework to study optimal pricing and price competition in the presence of multiple equilibria caused by network externalities. This framework provides a simple approach to equilibrium selection, based upon consumers’ “impulses,” that yields concise predictions regarding when firms will be “in” and when “out.” We highlight the role of past consumption and “influencers” in shaping impulses, and provide a unified explanation for a variety of stylized facts including why: (i) it is difficult to become “in”; (ii) the “in” position is fragile; (iii) “in” firms are not asleep in the sense that they continuously raise quality and keep prices low; and (iv) “in” firms acquire startups to entrench their position.

∗We are grateful to Gonzalo Cisternas, Luis Garicano, Bob Gibbons, Tom Hubbard, Bob Pindyck, and seminar participants at Kellogg, MIT, Melbourne, and UNSW for helpful discussions. Akerlof acknowledges support from the Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET). Holden acknowledges support from the Australian Research Council (ARC) Future Fellowship FT130101159. Rayo acknowledges support from the Marriner S. Eccles Institute for Economics and Quantitative Analysis.

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1 Introduction

Many markets exhibit significant network externalities. These markets have three key features. First, winning firms serve a disproportionate share of their markets, with a large size gap between them and their closest rivals. Indeed, the five largest publicly traded companies in the world (Apple, Google/Alphabet, Microsoft, Amazon, Facebook) all operate in such markets.

Second, it is difficult to become a winner and yet success is so fragile that it can vanish overnight. The difficulties of becoming popular (going from being “out” to being “in”) are illustrated by Microsoft’s search engine Bing, which despite years of sizeable investments remains much smaller than the current superstar Google. The ease with which a successful firm can suddenly fail (going from “in” to “out”) is illustrated by the web browser Netscape, which despite its initial dominant status was overtaken quite suddenly by Microsoft’s Internet Explorer.

Finally, despite their seemingly dominant position, winners are not asleep. Winners tend to continuously raise quality (for example, by purchasing new startups) while at the same time keeping their prices low, sometimes even below average cost.

The pioneering work of Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Becker (1991) shows that network externalities can generate demand curves with both downward- and upward-sloping regions, depending on whether the traditional price effect or the network effect dominates. Such demand curves admit the possibility of multiple equilibria.

Equilibrium selection — whether firms end up “in” or “out” — is central to understanding these markets. It underlies issues of firm strategy, such as optimal pricing and incentives for innovation; the outcome of competition; and appropriate antitrust policy. Our main contribution in this paper is to offer a tractable theory of equilibrium selection in these markets, based upon Kets and Sandroni (2017)’s concept of introspective equilibrium. Our refinement emphasizes the economic importance of consumers’ “impulses” for equilibrium selection, as well as the roles of past consumption and “influencers” in shaping these impulses. As we shall see, this theory accounts for the three features of markets with network externalities mentioned above.
We are certainly not the first to study markets with network externalities. Rochet and Tirole (2003) observed that many of these markets are multi-sided and involve interaction through platforms; and they initiated a literature analyzing such markets.¹ There is also a literature on “switching costs” beginning with Klemperer (1987) (see also Klemperer (1995) and Farrell and Klemperer (2007)). Like us, this literature emphasizes the importance of past consumption for present consumption. Finally, in our model a dominant (“in”) firm is disciplined in the price it charges by “out” firms with lower market share — a feature that bears some similarity to the literature on “limit pricing.”²

What distinguishes our approach from the above work is our emphasis on equilibrium selection.³

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline model with a single firm. Section 3 considers price competition among two firms. Section 4 considers the special case of a piecewise linear demand curve. Section 5 extends our model to multi-sided markets, and Section 6 concludes.

2 Monopoly Case

To begin, we will consider a setting with a single firm (a monopolist). We assume that each period \((t = 1, 2, ..., T)\) the monopolist chooses a price \(p^t\). The marginal cost of production is constant — and we normalize it to zero.

There is a set of heterogeneous consumers. Consumer \(i\)’s demand at time \(t\), denoted \(q^t_i\), depends upon the price \(p^t\) and upon aggregate consumption \(Q^t\); that is, \(q^t_i = D_i(p^t, Q^t)\). We assume \(D_i\) is decreasing in \(p^t\) and increasing in \(Q^t\), reflecting the presence of positive network externalities.

For any given \(p^t\), an equilibrium quantity \(Q^{t*}\) satisfies:

¹Some notable contributions include Rochet and Tirole (2006), Armstrong (2006), and Weyl (2010).
²For classic references on limit pricing, see Gaskins (1971) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982), and for a more recent contribution that focuses on entry deterrence in markets with network externalities see Fudenberg and Tirole (2000).
³Existing work typically follows the convention that consumers coordinate on the equilibrium with the highest level of sales (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (2000)).
\[ Q^{*} = \sum_{i} D_i \left( p^i, Q^{*} \right). \]

In the spirit of Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Becker (1991), we will focus attention on cases where this relationship gives rise to demand curves with regions of positive slope. We are interested, specifically, in demand curves of the type shown in Figure 1, which we term “in/out.” The idea, loosely speaking, is that when total consumption is low, the network effect is weak and demand has a standard shape (i.e. a negative slope). When total consumption exceeds a first critical level \( Q_L \) in the figure, the network externality begins to dominate, causing marginal value to grow with quantity. When total consumption exceeds a second critical level \( Q_H \) in the figure, the network externality is exhausted and demand again has a standard shape. The next section formalizes this possibility.
2.1 Micro-foundation for In/Out Demand

Assume there is a continuum of consumers \((i \in [0, 1])\). Consumer \(i\) has an idiosyncratic taste \(\theta_i\) for the monopolist’s good. The \(\theta_i\)’s are distributed iid according to a distribution with cdf \(F\).

Consumers face a binary choice whether to consume. We normalize to zero the utility from not consuming; and we assume the utility from consuming is \(\theta_i + \mu + \alpha \cdot Q - p\), where \(\mu\) is the quality of the monopolist’s good relative to the outside option, \(Q\) is the population mass currently consuming, and \(p\) is the price. The parameter \(\alpha\) captures the size of the network externalities.

Under these assumptions, agent \(i\) consumes if and only if \(\theta_i + \mu + \alpha \cdot Q - p \geq 0\). Therefore, the agents who consume are those whose idiosyncratic taste for the good exceeds a threshold: \(\theta_i \geq \hat{\theta}\), where

\[
\hat{\theta} = \frac{p - \mu - \alpha \cdot Q}{\text{effective price} - \text{network externality}}.
\]

(1)

The threshold is increasing in the good’s “effective price” (the price net of quality) and it is decreasing in the size of the network externality.

Observe that aggregate demand \(Q\) is equal to the mass of consumers above the threshold:

\[
Q = 1 - F(\hat{\theta}).
\]

(2)

Combining equations (1) and (2), we find that:

\[
Q = 1 - F(p - \mu - \alpha \cdot Q).
\]

(3)

Rearranging terms, we obtain (inverse) demand:

\[
p^d(Q) = F^{-1}(1 - Q) + \alpha \cdot Q + \mu.
\]

(4)

Notice from equation (4) that \(\mu\), the good’s quality relative to the outside option, shifts the demand curve vertically.
We can differentiate equation (4) to obtain an expression for the slope of demand:

\[
\frac{dp^d(Q)}{dQ} = \alpha - \frac{1}{f(F^{-1}(1 - Q))}.
\]

(5)

The slope depends both upon the size of network externalities (term 1) and the distribution of consumers’ tastes (term 2). Demand is downward-sloping in the absence of network externalities; but demand may be upward-sloping when network externalities are present.

From here, it is easy to obtain an in/out demand curve. Suppose, for instance, \(F\) is a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance \(\sigma^2\). The demand curve has a maximum slope of \(\alpha - \frac{1}{f(0)} = \alpha - \sqrt{2\pi\sigma^2}\) (at \(Q = \frac{1}{2}\)). The demand curve has a minimum slope of \(\alpha - \frac{1}{f(\pm\infty)} = -\infty\) (at \(Q = 0\) and \(Q = 1\)). Therefore, demand has an in/out shape, as in Figure 1, if the network externalities are sufficiently large (\(\alpha > \sqrt{2\pi\sigma^2}\)).

More generally, if \(F\) has support \(\mathbb{R}\) and the pdf is single-peaked, there exists a threshold \(\hat{\alpha} > 0\) such that:

1. Demand is downward-sloping if \(\alpha \leq \hat{\alpha}\).

2. Demand is in/out if \(\alpha > \hat{\alpha}\).\(^5\)

To understand the in/out shape, consider Figures 2a and 2b. Figure 2a depicts an in/out demand curve and Figure 2b depicts the solution to equation (3), which gives rise to this demand curve. Observe that, in Figure 2a, if the firm sets an intermediate price (\(p_{\min} < p < p_{\max}\)), there are three intersections with the in/out demand curve — hence three Nash equilibria. We will denote these equilibria as \(Q^{out}(p)\), \(Q^{mid}(p)\), and \(Q^{in}(p)\) (where \(Q^{out}(p) < Q^{mid}(p) < Q^{in}(p)\)).\(^6\)

\(^4\)If consumers’ tastes instead follow a uniform distribution, the demand curve has a constant slope because \(f(\theta)\) is constant.

\(^5\)Katz and Shapiro (1985) focus on demand curves with an upside-down U-shape. Their microfoundation is slightly different from ours: they assume idiosyncratic tastes are uniformly distributed (\(F\) uniform) and obtain an upward-sloping region by assuming that the network externalities are nonlinear (i.e., \(\alpha\) is a function of \(Q\)). Becker (1991) focuses both on demand curves with an upside-down U-shape and on in/out demand curves; he does not offer a micro-foundation.

\(^6\)Notice that \(Q^{mid}(p) = Q^{out}(p)\) when \(p = p_{\min}\), and \(Q^{mid}(p) = Q^{in}(p)\) when \(p = p_{\max}\).
(a) In/Out Demand Curve

(b) Demand curve solves: $Q = 1 - F(p - \mu - \alpha Q)$

Figure 2
Figure 2b formalizes why, at intermediate prices, there are three possible quantities demanded and shows the impact of a change in price. $Q^{out}(p)$ and $Q^{in}(p)$ both decrease when $p$ rises; correspondingly, the demand curve is downward sloping at $Q^{out}(p)$ and $Q^{in}(p)$. In contrast, $Q^{mid}(p)$ increases when $p$ rises; correspondingly, the demand curve is upward sloping at $Q^{mid}(p)$.

2.2 Equilibrium Selection

In this section, we offer a simple theory of equilibrium selection. This theory will be central to our analysis.

We begin by invoking a general refinement of Nash equilibrium due to Kets and Sandroni (2017) called “introspective equilibrium.” Introspective equilibrium is based upon level-k thinking (see Crawford et al. (2013) for a survey). Agents have exogenously-given “impulses,” which determine how they react at level 0. At level $k > 0$, each agent formulates a best response to the belief that opponents are at level $k - 1$. Introspective equilibrium is defined as the limit of this process at $k \to \infty$. Introspective equilibrium nests a wide range of refinement concepts, corresponding to different assumptions about agents’ impulses.\(^7\)

We apply introspective equilibrium to our setting as follows.

**Definition 1** (Introspective Equilibrium for In/Out Demand).

Fix a time period $t$. Players are endowed with level-0 choices $q_{i0}$ called (individual) impulses, which leads to an (aggregate) impulse $Q_0$. For any given $p$, an introspective equilibrium $(q^*_i, Q^*)$ is constructed as follows:

1. Level $k = 1, 2, ..., $ denoted $(q_{ik}, Q_k)$, is obtained by letting each consumer best-respond to price $p$ and the belief that other consumers are at level $k - 1$.

2. An introspective equilibrium is the limit as $k \to \infty$:

$$ (q^*_i, Q^*) = \lim_{k \to \infty} (q_{ik}, Q_k). $$

\(^7\)Risk dominance, for instance, corresponds to the case where agents are uncertain about each others’ impulses.
The impulses \((\bar{q}_i, \bar{Q}_0)\) play a key role in our model. To begin, we assume that each agent’s impulse in period \(t\) is to do what she did in the previous period; that is \(\bar{q}_{i0} = q_{i}^{t-1}\) and \(\bar{Q}_0 = Q_t^{t-1}\). We take agents’ impulses in the first period as exogenous and denote them as \(q^0_i\) and \(Q^0\).

Proposition 1 derives the introspective equilibrium as a function of the aggregate impulse \((Q_t^{t-1})\).

**Proposition 1.** Fix a time \(t\) and suppose the aggregate impulse is \(Q_t^{t-1}\). When \(p_{\text{min}} \leq p \leq p_{\text{max}}\), the unique introspective equilibrium is:

\[
Q^* (p, Q_t^{t-1}) = \begin{cases} 
Q^{\text{in}}(p), & \text{if } Q_t^{t-1} > Q^{\text{mid}}(p). \\
Q^{\text{mid}}(p), & \text{if } Q_t^{t-1} = Q^{\text{mid}}(p). \\
Q^{\text{out}}(p), & \text{if } Q_t^{t-1} < Q^{\text{mid}}(p).
\end{cases}
\]

When \(p > p_{\text{max}}\) or \(p < p_{\text{min}}\), \(Q^* (p, Q_t^{t-1})\) is the unique solution to equation (3).

**Proof of Proposition 1**

The proof is easy to derive. Suppose first that \(p_{\text{min}} \leq p \leq p_{\text{max}}\). From equation (3), we obtain the evolution of aggregate consumption between levels \(k\) and \(k + 1\):

\[
\bar{Q}_{k+1} = 1 - F(p - \mu - \alpha \bar{Q}_k).
\] (6)

Figure 3 corresponds to equation (6). It shows how, starting from an initial impulse \((Q_t^{t-1})\), the aggregate consumption level evolves.

Observe that, if there is a high initial impulse to consume \((Q_t^{t-1} > Q^{\text{mid}}(p))\), aggregate consumption increases between levels 0 and 1. Intuitively, the high level of consumption at level 0 drives more agents to consume at level 1. Consumption continues to increase between levels 2 and 3, 3 and 4, and so forth, reaching \(Q^{\text{in}}(p)\) in the limit. Hence, when \(Q_t^{t-1} > Q^{\text{mid}}(p)\), the introspective equilibrium is \(Q^{\text{in}}(p)\). By a similar logic, aggregate consumption falls between successive levels when \(Q_t^{t-1} < Q^{\text{mid}}(p)\). When \(Q_t^{t-1} < Q^{\text{mid}}(p)\), the introspective equilibrium is \(Q^{\text{out}}(p)\).
\[ Q_{k+1} = 1 - F(p - \mu - \alpha Q_k) \]

Finally, when \( p > p_{\text{max}} \) or \( p < p_{\text{min}} \), the proof follows from a similar argument. The only difference is that there is a single intersection in the analog of Figure 3. Q.E.D.

Corollary 1 presents the main result in this section. It tells us that, depending on the impulse, the firm faces one of three negatively-sloped demand curves shown in Figure 4.

**Corollary 1.** In any period, the firm faces one of three downward-sloping demand curves (depending upon \( Q^{t-1} \)):

1. “In” Demand Curve (\( Q^{t-1} \geq Q_H \)). See Figure 4a.
2. “Out” Demand Curve (\( Q^{t-1} \leq Q_L \)). See Figure 4b.
3. “Between” Demand Curve (\( Q_L < Q^{t-1} < Q_H \)). See Figure 4c.

If \( Q^{t-1} \geq Q_H \), the monopolist faces the best possible equilibrium selection (that is, the “in” demand curve). In this case, we will say that the firm is “in.” If \( Q^{t-1} \leq Q_L \),
(a) “In” Demand Curve \( (Q_{t-1} \geq Q_H) \)

(b) “Out” Demand Curve \( (Q_{t-1} \leq Q_L) \)

(c) “Between” Demand Curve \( (Q_L < Q_{t-1} < Q_H) \)

Figure 4
the monopolist faces the worst possible equilibrium selection (that is, the “out” demand curve). In this case, we will say that the firm is “out.” And if \( Q_L < Q^{t-1} < Q_H \), the monopolist faces an intermediate equilibrium selection (that is, the “between” demand curve). In this case, we will say that the firm is “between.”

If, in period \( t \), the firm sells no less than \( Q_H \), we will say the firm ends the period “in.” Similarly, if the firm sells no more than \( Q_L \), we will say that the firm ends the period “out.” And, if the firm sells an intermediate amount (\( Q_L < Q^t < Q_H \)), we will say that the firm ends the period “between.”

To illustrate the process of transitioning from “out” to “in,” suppose the firm begins period \( t \) “out” (\( Q^{t-1} \leq Q_L \)). If the firm sets a price above \( p_{\text{min}} \), it will sell less than \( Q_L \) and consequently continue to face an “out” demand curve in period \( t+1 \). If instead the firm sets a price below \( p_{\text{min}} \), it will sell more than \( Q_H \) and consequently face an “in” demand curve in period \( t+1 \). This allows the firm to raise its price as far as \( p_{\text{max}} \) in period \( t+1 \) without losing its “in” status.

### 2.3 Optimal Pricing

We are now in a position to formally state the monopolist’s problem and describe optimal pricing.

Profits in period \( t \) (\( t = 1, 2, ..., T \)) are \( \pi^t = p^t \cdot Q^t \), and \( Q^t = Q^*(p^t, Q^{t-1}) \) (where \( Q^*(p^t, Q^{t-1}) \) is defined as in Proposition 1). We take \( Q^0 \), the initial consumption level or impulse, as given. In each period, the monopolist chooses price to maximize the discounted sum of future profits, using discount factor \( \delta \).

**Case 1: the firm is myopic (\( \delta = 0 \))**

Here, the firm sets \( p^t \) to maximize \( \pi^t = p^t \cdot Q^*(p^t, Q^{t-1}) \). Lemma 1 (stated below) says that, when the firm prices optimally, it ends period \( t \) either “in” or “out” — not “between.”

**Lemma 1.** If the firm is myopic (\( \delta = 0 \)) and prices optimally, it ends period \( t \) either “in” \( (Q^t \geq Q_H) \) or “out” \( (Q^t \leq Q_L) \).

The proof is simple. The only way for the firm to end period \( t \) “between” is if it
starts the period “between” and chooses a price such that \( Q_t = Q_{t-1} \). But, as Figure 4c shows, starting at such a price, a small decrease in the price increases demand by a discontinuous amount. Thus, the hypothesized price cannot be optimal.

Given Lemma 1, we can think of the firm as choosing between: (i) the optimal price conditional on ending period \( t \) “in” and (ii) the optimal price conditional on ending period \( t \) “out.” Let \( p_{in}^*(Q_{t-1}) \) denote the optimal price conditional on ending period \( t \) “in” and let \( \pi_{in}^*(Q_{t-1}) \) denote the associated profits. Similarly, let \( p_{out}^*(Q_{t-1}) \) denote the optimal price conditional on ending period \( t \) “out” and let \( \pi_{out}^*(Q_{t-1}) \) denote the associated profits.

To end period \( t \) “in,” the firm must price below a threshold, \( p_{\text{thresh}}(Q_{t-1}) \); to end period \( t \) “out,” the firm must price above this threshold. Observe that, when \( Q_{t-1} \leq Q_L \), the threshold is \( p_{\text{min}} \); when \( Q_{t-1} \geq Q_H \), the threshold is \( p_{\text{max}} \); and when \( Q_L < Q_{t-1} < Q_H \), the threshold is between \( p_{\text{min}} \) and \( p_{\text{max}} \).

It is easier to end period \( t \) “in” when the threshold is higher; and the threshold is higher when the impulse, \( Q_{t-1} \), is higher. Consequently, the “in” price \( (p_{in}^*(Q_{t-1})) \) and the associated profits \( (\pi_{in}^*(Q_{t-1})) \) are both weakly increasing in the impulse \( (Q_{t-1}) \). This is stated formally as Lemma 2.

**Lemma 2.** \( p_{in}^*(Q_{t-1}) \) and \( \pi_{in}^*(Q_{t-1}) \) are both weakly increasing in \( Q_{t-1} \).

Similarly, it is easier to end period \( t \) “out” when the threshold is lower. The threshold is lowest when \( Q_{t-1} \leq Q_L \) (i.e., when the firm starts period \( t \) “out”). Let \( p_{\text{local}} \) denote the value of \( p_{out}^*(Q_{t-1}) \) when the threshold is lowest. Let \( q_{\text{local}} \) denote the associated quantity demanded and let \( \pi_{\text{local}} \) denote the associated profits. Observe that \( \pi_{\text{local}} \) is an upper bound on \( \pi_{out}^*(Q_{t-1}) \).

For a given impulse, \( Q_{t-1} \), either: (1) \( p_{\text{local}} \geq p_{\text{thresh}}(Q_{t-1}) \); or (2) \( p_{\text{local}} < p_{\text{thresh}}(Q_{t-1}) \). In case (1), since \( p_{\text{local}} \) is above the threshold, the “out” price is equal to \( p_{\text{local}} \) and the “out” profits are equal to \( \pi_{\text{local}} \).

Now consider case (2). Since \( p_{\text{local}} \) is less than the threshold, when the monopolist sets a price of \( p_{\text{local}} \), he ends period \( t \) “in” and sells a quantity greater than \( q_{\text{local}} \).

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8Formally, the threshold price is the minimum price for which the quantity demanded is greater than or equal to \( Q_L \): \( p_{\text{thresh}}(Q_{t-1}) = \min\{p : Q^*(p, Q_{t-1}) \geq Q_L\} \).
Since the quantity sold exceeds $q_{\text{local}}$, the monopolist’s profits are also greater than $\pi_{\text{local}}$. Hence, a price of $p_{\text{local}}$ results in a profit above $\pi_{\text{local}}$ (the upper bound on “out” profits). It follows that, in case (2), the “in” price yields a higher profit than the “out” price.

We conclude, therefore, that whenever the monopolist chooses the “out” price over the “in” price, the “out” price is equal to $p_{\text{local}}$ and the “out” profits are equal to $\pi_{\text{local}}$. Lemma 3, stated below, summarizes.

**Lemma 3.** If the firm chooses to end period $t$ “out,” it will set a price of $p_{\text{local}}$ and earn a profit of $\pi_{\text{local}}$.

Lemmas 2 and 3 imply that, if $\pi_{\text{in}}^*(Q^{t-1}) > \pi_{\text{local}}$, the firm chooses the “in” price and earns a profit of $\pi_{\text{in}}^*(Q^{t-1})$; otherwise, the firm chooses price $p_{\text{local}}$ and earns a profit of $\pi_{\text{local}}$. Figure 5 illustrates the firm’s pricing problem (i.e., whether to choose price $p_{\text{in}}^*$ or $p_{\text{local}}$). Proposition 2 immediately follows.

**Proposition 2.** Suppose the firm is myopic ($\delta = 0$). Depending upon the shape of the demand curve (which is a function of $\alpha$, $\mu$, and $F$), there are three cases:

(i) It is optimal to go “in” in period $t$ (choose $p^t$ such that $Q^t \geq Q_H$) regardless of the value of $Q^{t-1}$.

(ii) It is optimal to go “out” in period $t$ (choose $p^t$ such that $Q^t \leq Q_L$) regardless of the value of $Q^{t-1}$.

(iii) It is optimal for “in” (“out”) firms to stay “in” (“out”). “Between” firms go “in” (“out”) if $Q^{t-1}$ is above (below) a cutoff ($Q_{\text{myopic}}$).

Instance (i) of Proposition 2 arises when $\pi_{\text{in}}^*(Q^{t-1})$ is greater than $\pi_{\text{local}}$ for all values of $Q^{t-1}$. Instance (ii) arises when $\pi_{\text{in}}^*(Q^{t-1})$ is less than $\pi_{\text{local}}$ for all values of $Q^{t-1}$. Instance (iii) arises when $\pi_{\text{in}}^*(Q^{t-1}) > \pi_{\text{local}}$ if and only if $Q^{t-1}$ is above a cutoff ($Q_{\text{myopic}}$).

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9In the figure, $p_{\text{in}}^*$ is depicted as being right at the threshold for the firm to go “in” but $p_{\text{in}}^*$ may also be lower than that threshold.
Optimal Pricing: Myopic Case

(a) “Out” Demand Curve $Q_{t-1} \leq Q_L$

(b) “Between” Demand Curve ($Q_L < Q_{t-1} < Q_H$)

(c) “In” Demand Curve $Q_{t-1} \geq Q_H$

Figure 5
Case 2: the firm is not myopic ($\delta > 0$)

Proposition 3 compares the optimal pricing with that of a myopic firm.

**Proposition 3.** Suppose the firm is not myopic. In instances (i) and (ii) in Proposition 2, the firm acts as if it were myopic. In instance (iii), the firm potentially acts non-myopically in the first period, but acts myopically after that. Specifically, if $Q^{\text{non-myopic}} < Q^0 < Q^{\text{myopic}}$, the firm charges a price below the myopic optimum in the first period so as to go “in” — a form of investment — and stays “in” in all subsequent periods. If instead $Q^0 > Q^{\text{myopic}}$ (respectively, $Q^0 < Q^{\text{non-myopic}}$), the firm behaves as if it were myopic and in every period goes “in” (respectively, “out”).

**Proof of Proposition 3**

In instance (i), even if the firm disregarded the future, it would choose the “in” price over the “out” price for any initial impulse. Concern about the future only makes the firm more inclined to choose the “in” price, so it does not change the firm’s behavior.

In instance (ii), the firm does not value having a higher impulse tomorrow: since the “out” profits ($\pi_{\text{local}}$), which do not depend upon the impulse, always exceed the “in” profits. Consequently, the firm behaves as if it were myopic.

We now turn to instance (iii). Observe that a lower price today (weakly) benefits the firm tomorrow: since a lower price today results in a higher impulse-to-consume tomorrow. Consequently, concern about the future lowers the cutoff impulse for choosing the “in” price over the “out” price. Q.E.D.

According to the proposition, the firm has an incentive to price below the myopic level in the first period in order to become “in” in subsequent periods — and reap the associated benefits.\(^{10}\)

The strategy of pricing low initially to become “in” seems to be commonplace. For instance, according to Adam Cohen, to build up its network in its early days,\(^{10}\).

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\(^{10}\)The switching-cost literature gives one reason why firms would want to price low initially: doing so builds up a set of locked-in consumers. Our framework shows an additional reason: even in the absence of switching costs, pricing low initially builds up a product’s perceived popularity, via the impulse.
PayPal “offered the service for free to both buyers and sellers and used millions of dollars in VC funds to hand out bounties of five dollars to everyone who signed up...Handing out free money was costly, but fairly effective: by the end of 1999, PayPal had signed up twelve thousand registered users.”\textsuperscript{11,12}

2.4 Influencers

Suppose there is an agent, called an “influencer,” who is connected to a fraction $\phi$ of the consumers and has the ability to shift those consumers’ impulses: from “don’t consume” to “consume” or vice-versa. Let $b \in \{0, 1\}$ denote the influencer’s choice whether to shift consumers’ impulses to “consume” or “don’t consume.”

The influencer can play a pivotal role in determining whether the firm is “in” or “out,” as the following corollary to Proposition 1 demonstrates.

\textbf{Corollary 2.} \textit{The firm faces}

1. An “In” Demand Curve if:

\[(1 - \phi)Q^{t-1} + \phi b \geq Q_H.\]

2. An “Out” Demand Curve if:

\[(1 - \phi)Q^{t-1} + \phi b \leq Q_L.\]

3. A “Between” Demand Curve otherwise.

Given that influencers can help firms become — or stay — “in,” firms may be willing to pay influencers for their services. An “out” firm can become “in” without help from an influencer by dropping its price below $p_{min}$ for one period; but this is expensive. With help from an influencer, an “out” firm can become “in” without

\textsuperscript{11}Cohen (2003), p. 228. PayPal raised its fees after building up its network. In 2017, the standard PayPal online transaction fee in the United States was 2.9% plus 30 cents. The “merchant rate” (available to those conducting $3,000 of business a month) was 1.9% plus 30 cents.

\textsuperscript{12}This is by no means an isolated case. For example, in its “Free Basics Initiative,” Facebook offers low-income consumers in developing countries free internet access to select websites.
dropping its price as much. In a competitive setting, an “in” firm might also pay an influencer in order to protect its “in” position against rivals (see Section 3 for further discussion of the competitive case).

In practice, one way in which an influencer might operate is by changing default options. Defaults appear to have the ability to alter consumer expectations — and/or act as nudges — and thereby affect initial impulses.

An illustration can be seen in the “browser war” in the 90s between the originally-dominant Netscape and Microsoft’s Internet Explorer. After initial difficulties to penetrate the market, Internet Explorer eventually managed to displace Netscape; and when this happened, it happened suddenly. The key to overtaking Netscape was a deal between Microsoft and the internet provider AOL, whereby AOL agreed to set Internet Explorer as its default browser in exchange for valuable advertising. As Yoffie and Cusumano (1998) note: “To entice Steve Case, the CEO of AOL, to make Internet Explorer AOL’s preferred browser, Gates offered to put an AOL icon on the Windows 95 desktop, perhaps the most expensive real estate in the world. In exchange for promoting Internet Explorer as its default browser, AOL would have almost equal importance with [AOL’s rival] MSN on future versions of Windows.” To this day, the browser wars continue, with smartphones being the latest battlefront. Here again, defaults appear to play a major role (e.g. Cain Miller (2012)).

Remark: Large Consumers

Suppose, in addition to small consumers, there is a large consumer who has the ability to purchase a large quantity of the monopolist’s good. Like an influencer, a large consumer can help tip the monopolist from “out” to “in.” Consequently, one would expect the monopolist to pay the large consumer a rent — just as he would pay a rent to an influencer. This rent might take the form of a discount relative to the price charged to small consumers.

We see such rents in the music streaming business, for instance. Services like Spotify, Apple Music, and Tidal involve large network externalities. It is not

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We see such rents in the music streaming business, for instance. Services like Spotify, Apple Music, and Tidal involve large network externalities. It is not
surprising, then, that both Apple Music and Tidal sought to challenge Spotify’s dominant position by signing big-name artists such as Beyoncé, Drake, Frank Ocean and Kanye West, to exclusive deals on favorable terms to the artists. According to *Rolling Stone*, “Superstar exclusives...have helped Apple and, to a lesser extent, Tidal generate millions of new customers, intensifying competition with Spotify.”

3 Competition

It is a simple step to move from a monopoly setting to a competitive setting. Suppose there are two firms (1 and 2) that engage in price competition. At stage 1, firm 1 sets price $p_1$. At stage 2, firm 2 sets price $p_2$.

We continue to assume there is a continuum of consumers ($i \in [0, 1]$) with tastes $\theta_i$ distributed $F$. Now, $\theta_i$ represents consumer $i$’s taste for good 1 relative to good 2. Consumers make a binary choice whether to consume good 1 or good 2. Hence, overall demand, $Q_1 + Q_2$, sums to 1. The utility from consuming good 1 is $\theta_i + \mu + \alpha \cdot Q_1 - p_1$, where $\mu$ denotes the quality of good 1 relative to good 2. The utility from consuming good 2 is $\alpha \cdot Q_2 - p_2$.

Under these assumptions, demand for each good depends upon the price differential: $\Delta = p_1 - p_2$. We will focus on cases where the resulting demand curve is in/out, as pictured in Figure 5. Observe that, whenever demand for good 1 is in/out, demand for good 2 will also be in/out (given that $Q_2 = 1 - Q_1$).

We can use the same technique as before to derive a formula for demand. Observe that consumer $i$ chooses good 1 over good 2 if and only if $\theta_i + \mu + \alpha \cdot Q_1 - p_1 \geq \alpha \cdot Q_2 - p_2$. Therefore, the agents who consume good 1 are those whose taste for good 1 exceeds

An increase in the number of artists on a service makes it more attractive to users; a larger user base, in turn, increases the willingness of artists to join a service.


16 Were we to plot the in/out demand curve for good 2, we would place $p_2 - p_1 = -\Delta$ on the $y$-axis rather than $\Delta$. 
a threshold $\hat{\theta}$, where:

$$\hat{\theta} = \frac{p_1 - p_2 - \mu - \alpha \cdot (Q_1 - Q_2)}{1 - Q_1}.$$

$$= \frac{\Delta - \mu - \alpha \cdot (2Q_1 - 1)}{\text{effective price network externality}}.$$  \hfill (7)

Given that demand for good 1 consists of the mass of consumers above the threshold:

$$Q_1 = 1 - F(\hat{\theta}).$$ \hfill (8)

Combining (7) and (8), we obtain the analog of equation (3):

$$Q_1 = 1 - F(\Delta - \mu - \alpha \cdot (2Q_1 - 1)).$$ \hfill (9)

Rearranging terms yields (inverse) demand for good 1:

$$\Delta^d(Q_1) = \mu + \alpha \cdot (2Q_1 - 1) + F^{-1}(1 - Q_1).$$ \hfill (10)
Observe that a change in the quality of good 1 relative to good 2, $\mu$, shifts demand vertically. Next, differentiating equation (10), we obtain a formula for the slope of demand:

$$
\frac{d\Delta^d(Q)_1}{dQ_1} = 2\alpha - \frac{1}{f(F^{-1}(1 - Q_1))}.
$$

(11)

As before, if $F$ has support $\mathbb{R}$ and the pdf is single-peaked, there exists a threshold $\hat{\alpha} > 0$ such that:

1. Demand is downward-sloping if $\alpha \leq \hat{\alpha}$.

2. Demand is in/out if $\alpha > \hat{\alpha}$.

**Remark: Product Compatibility**

It is easy to incorporate into our framework the idea that competing products may be more or less compatible.\textsuperscript{17} Suppose the utility from consuming good 1 is $\theta_1 + \mu + \alpha \cdot (Q_1 + \gamma Q_2) - p_1$ and the utility from consuming good 2 is $\alpha \cdot (Q_2 + \gamma Q_1) - p_2$. The parameter $\gamma \in [0, 1]$ represents the degree of compatibility of the goods; when they are more compatible, the consumers of good 1 derive more utility from the consumption of good 2 (and vice-versa). The baseline model corresponds to the case of perfect incompatibility ($\gamma = 0$).

This addition to the model has the following effect on the threshold for consuming good 1:

$$
\hat{\theta} = \Delta - \mu - \alpha(1 - \gamma) \cdot (2Q_1 - 1).
$$

(12)

The only change relative to the baseline model is that $\alpha(1 - \gamma)$ appears in place of $\alpha$. Hence, greater product compatibility (higher $\gamma$) is equivalent, from the point of view of the firms, to smaller network externalities (lower $\alpha$).

\textsuperscript{17}The existing literature on network externalities has highlighted product compatibility as an issue of interest: particularly, the incentives of firms to make their products compatible (see, for instance, Katz and Shapiro (1994)).
3.1 Equilibrium Selection

When the price differential $\Delta$ is in an intermediate range, there are multiple Nash equilibria ($Q^{out}_1(\Delta)$, $Q^{mid}_1(\Delta)$, and $Q^{in}_1(\Delta)$). To select between them, we will use the same equilibrium refinement as in the single-firm case. This yields the following analog of Proposition 1.

**Proposition 4.** Fix a time $t$ and suppose the aggregate impulse for firm 1 is $Q^{t-1}_1$.

When $\Delta_{\text{min}} \leq \Delta \leq \Delta_{\text{max}}$, the unique introspective equilibrium is:

$$Q^*_1(\Delta, Q^{t-1}_1) = \begin{cases} 
Q^{\text{in}}_1(\Delta), & \text{if } Q^{t-1}_1 > Q^{\text{mid}}_1(\Delta). \\
Q^{\text{mid}}_1(\Delta), & \text{if } Q^{t-1}_1 = Q^{\text{mid}}_1(\Delta). \\
Q^{\text{out}}_1(\Delta), & \text{if } Q^{t-1}_1 < Q^{\text{mid}}_1(\Delta). 
\end{cases}$$

When $\Delta > \Delta_{\text{max}}$ or $\Delta < \Delta_{\text{min}}$, $Q^*_1(\Delta, Q^{t-1}_1)$ is the unique solution to equation (9).

The following corollary to Proposition 4 is analogous to Corollary 1. It says that firm 1 faces one of the three negatively-sloped demand curves shown in Figure 6.

**Corollary 3.** In any period, firm 1 faces one of three downward-sloping demand curves (depending upon $Q^{t-1}_1$):

1. “In” Demand Curve ($Q^{t-1}_1 \geq Q_H$). See Figure 6a.
2. “Out” Demand Curve ($Q^{t-1}_1 \leq Q_L$). See Figure 6b.
3. “Between” Demand Curve ($Q_L < Q^{t-1}_1 < Q_H$). See Figure 6c.18

We will again refer to a firm as “in,” “out,” or “between” depending upon whether it faces an “in,” “out,” or “between” demand curve. Because overall demand is fixed ($Q_1 + Q_2 = 1$), either both firms are “between” or one is “in” and the other is “out.”

---

18From the demand curve for firm 1, it is easy to derive the demand curve for firm 2, as $Q_2 = 1 - Q_1$. Note that firm 2 is “in” when $Q^{t-1}_2 \geq 1 - Q_L$, firm 2 is “out” when $Q^{t-1}_2 \leq 1 - Q_H$, and firm 2 is “between” when $1 - Q_H < Q^{t-1}_2 < 1 - Q_L$. 

21
(a) “In” Demand Curve: Price Competition \((Q_{t-1}^l \geq Q_H)\)

(b) “Out” Demand Curve: Price Competition \((Q_{t-1}^l \leq Q_L)\)

(c) “Between” Demand Curve: Price Competition \((Q_L < Q_{t-1}^l < Q_H)\)

Figure 6
We will focus attention in what follows on the case where firm 1 starts “in” and firm 2 starts “out.” This corresponds to many cases of interest, where competition is between an established firm that has built up a network and a recent entrant.

3.2 Analysis

We are now in a position to formally state and analyze the pricing game played by the firms.

Recall that, at stage 1, firm 1 sets a price $p_1$; at stage 2, firm 2 sets a price $p_2$. The resulting payoffs to the firms are

\[ \pi_1 = p_1 \cdot Q_1^{in}(\Delta) \quad \text{and} \quad \pi_2 = p_2 \cdot (1 - Q_1^{in}(\Delta)), \]

where $\Delta = p_1 - p_2$. Observe that $\pi_1$ and $\pi_2$ depend upon the shape of the demand curve; the demand curve, in turn, depends upon parameters $\alpha$, $\mu$, and $F$.

We can use backward induction to solve for the equilibrium of the game. Let $p_{2BR}(p_1)$ denote firm 2’s best response to price $p_1$ and let $\Delta(p_1) = p_1 - p_{2BR}(p_1)$. Firm 1 chooses $p_1$ to maximize:

\[ \pi_1(p_1) = p_1 \cdot Q_1^{in}(\Delta(p_1)). \]

Firm 1 “remains in” if $\Delta(p_1) \leq p_{\text{max}}$ and “falls out” if $\Delta(p_1) > p_{\text{max}}$. We will refer to $\Delta(p_1) \leq p_{\text{max}}$ as the “remain-in constraint” or RIC. Demand for good 1 decreases discontinuously when firm 1 falls out. Hence, there is an incentive for firm 1 to choose a price that satisfies RIC. Furthermore — and most importantly — RIC will be a binding constraint in a region of the parameter space.

It is easy to show that, to remain in, firm 1 must set a price below a threshold $p_{\text{RIC}}$ (the formal argument is given as part of the proof of Proposition 5 below). Therefore, the following is an equivalent formulation of the remain-in constraint:

\[ p_1 \leq p_{\text{RIC}}(\alpha, \mu, F). \quad (\text{RIC}) \]

Proposition 5 characterizes how a change in the goods’ relative qualities ($\mu$) affects the equilibrium outcome in the region where RIC binds.
Proposition 5. When RIC binds, increases in the quality of good 1 relative to good 2, as measured by $\mu$:

1. Translate one-to-one into increases in good 1’s equilibrium price:

$$\frac{\partial p_{RIC}}{\partial \mu} = 1.$$

2. Have no effect on good 2’s equilibrium price.

3. Have no effect on equilibrium quantities ($Q_1$ and $Q_2$).

Proof of Proposition 5

Figure 7 shows the demand for good 2 for a particular value of $p_1$. Firm 2’s best response to $p_1$ is either to choose:

1. The profit-maximizing price conditional on staying “out” ($p_{local}$ in the figure).

2. The profit-maximizing price conditional on going “in” ($p^*_{in}$ in the figure).\(^{19}\)

Region A in Figure 7 represents the profits to firm 2 from choosing $p_{local}$; Region B represents the profits from choosing $p^*_{in}$. Observe that RIC is satisfied when Region A is (weakly) larger than Region B; RIC binds when the regions are of equal size.

An increase in $p_1$ shifts firm 2’s demand curve vertically up, which increases the size of Region B relative to Region A.\(^{20}\) This explains why firm 1 must price below a threshold, $p_{RIC}$, in order to meet RIC.

Suppose RIC is a binding constraint and suppose demand curve D in Figure 7 depicts the place where RIC exactly binds. Observe that the demand curve firm 2 faces depends upon the “effective price” of good 1: $p_1 - \mu$. Hence, if $\mu$ decreases by an amount $\Delta \mu$, firm 1 must decrease $p_1$ by $\Delta \mu$ to stay on demand curve D. This explains why, in the region where RIC binds, a change in $\mu$ changes $p_1$ by an equivalent amount. Furthermore, since firm 2 always faces the same demand curve

\(^{19}\)In the figure, $p^*_{in}$ is depicted as being right at the threshold for firm 2 to go “in” but $p^*_{in}$ may also be lower than that threshold.

\(^{20}\)This observation follows from the Envelope Theorem and the fact that $Q_2(p^*_{in}) > Q^*_{local}$. 

24
The Remain-In Constraint (RIC)

\[ p_2^d(Q_2) \]

\[ p_{\text{local}} \]

\[ p^*_\text{in} \]

\[ Q_2^\text{local} \]

\[ Q_2(p^*_\text{in}) \]

\[ D' \]

\[ Q_2 \]

Figure 7

In the region where RIC binds, it always charges the same price \((p_{\text{local}})\) and sells the same quantity \((Q_2^\text{local})\). QED.

In practice, “in” firms may need to charge low — even zero — prices to satisfy the RIC constraint. For example, despite their overwhelming market shares, Google (in web search), Uber (in ride sharing), and Amazon Web Services (in cloud computing) all keep their prices low — arguably to stunt the rise of their nearest rivals.\(^{21}\)

Note that the “out” firm’s check on the “in” firm is a generalized form of “limit pricing,” whereby a monopolist is disciplined by a potential entrant. In our case, rather than deterring entry outright, the winning firm needs to deter the losing firm from becoming popular. It does so by allowing the losing firm to enjoy rents from a small but loyal consumer base, a form of consolation prize.

\(^{21}\)Note that one way in which online firms may charge users is by showing them advertisements.
3.3 Incentives for Innovation

The fact that when network externalities are large, the winning and losing firms compete for the “in” position, as opposed to merely competing for a single marginal consumer, has significant implications for the firms’ incentives to innovate.

To illustrate, suppose the two firms have an opportunity to invest up front on R&D activities that raise the intrinsic quality of their respective products. Let $\mu_i$ denote the intrinsic quality of firm’s $i$ product, with $\mu = \mu_1 - \mu_2$. Suppose quality $\mu_i$ costs $C(\mu_i)$ to obtain, where $C$ is twice differentiable and satisfies $C', C'' > 0$ and $C'(0) = 0$. Suppose $\mu_1$ and $\mu_2$ are observed by both firms before they engage in price competition. (The exact timing of the choices of $\mu_1$ and $\mu_2$ is immaterial.)

Corollary 4 shows that, when the network externality is strong, the two firms face radically different incentives to innovate:

**Corollary 4.** Consider the extended model with investments. Suppose firm 1 retains the “in” position and suppose that, in the pricing stage, the remain-in constraint is binding (that is, the network externality is large). Then:

1. Firm 1’s optimal investment $\mu_1^*$ satisfies

$$C'(\mu_1^*) = Q_1^*,$$

where $Q_1^*$ denotes the equilibrium sales of firm 1.

2. Firm 2 has zero incentive to innovate.

This result follows from the fact that when the remain-in constraint is binding, we have $\frac{d\mu_1}{d\mu} = 1$. As a result, an increase in firm 1’s quality translates one-to-one into an increase in its equilibrium price, and hence firm 1 invests in direct proportion to the size of its own market (which, given its winning position, is large). In contrast, an increase in firm 2’s quality translates one-to-one into an reduction in its rival’s price; thus, this higher quality has zero impact on firm 2’s revenues.

In practice, firms may also increase the quality of their products by acquiring start-ups with valuable product innovations. Indeed, such acquisitions are commonplace.
In the decade between 2008 and 2017, Google/Alphabet made 166 acquisitions, Amazon 51, Facebook 63, Ebay 31, Twitter 54, and Apple 66.\textsuperscript{22}

Competition for the “in” position may lead to highly asymmetric outcomes. To illustrate, suppose a third party (a “startup”) possesses an innovation and, prior to engaging in price competition, firms 1 and 2 bid in a (second-price) auction to buy the startup. Suppose the firm that acquires the startup adopts its innovation, and as a result improves its quality by $\Delta \mu$.

In this setting, provided the hypothesis of Corollary 4 is met, firm 1’s maximum bid for the startup is $2\Delta \mu Q_1$; whereas firm 2’s maximum bid is 0.\textsuperscript{23} Therefore, firm 1 acquires the startup and pays 0 for it, further cementing it dominant position. In fact, in a multi-period version of this merger game in which a new startup emerges in every period, the dominant firm outbids its rival for each new startup; thus, its dominant position becomes more and more entrenched as time goes by.

4 Piecewise Linear Demand

When consumers’ tastes follow a particular type of distribution (see Figure 8a), the in/out demand curve is piecewise linear. Figure 8b depicts the in/out demand curve for a monopolist firm corresponding to Figure 8a.

Piecewise linear demand facilitates an analysis of the effects of demand volatility. Furthermore, it allows us to solve explicitly for the outcome of price competition.

\textsuperscript{22}Consider a few of Apple’s acquisitions. PA Semi (purchased in 2008 for $278 million): a California-based chip designer whose acquisition was instrumental to Apple’s development of low-power processors. Siri (purchased in 2010 for $250 million): this virtual personal assistant technology has been integrated into a variety of Apple devices. C3 Technologies (purchased in 2011 for $273 million): one of several startups acquired by Apple to improve its mapping features. PrimeSense (purchased in 2013 for $360 million): an Israeli 3D sensing company whose technology powers the facial recognition features of the iPhone X.

\textsuperscript{23}By winning, firm 1 not only increases its quality by $\Delta \mu$, it also prevents firm 2 from increasing its quality by $\Delta \mu$. Hence firm 1 is willing to bid $2\Delta \mu$ per unit of expected sales.
(a) Pdf that gives rise to piecewise linear demand.

(b) Corresponding demand curve for the monopoly case (demand is in/out if \( \alpha > \frac{1}{v_1 + v_2} \)).

Figure 8
4.1 Demand Volatility

Suppose, as in Section 2, there is a monopolist who maximizes expected profits, and suppose there is just a single pricing period ($T = 1$). Consumers’ tastes are distributed as in Figure 8a and the network externalities are sufficiently large that demand is in/out ($\alpha > \frac{1}{v_1 + v_2}$). In contrast to Section 2, $\mu$ (the quality of the monopolist’s good relative to the outside option) is a random variable: $\mu = \hat{\mu} + \varepsilon$, where:

\[
\varepsilon = \begin{cases} 
\sigma, & \text{with probability } r \\
-\sigma, & \text{with probability } r \\
0 & \text{with probability } 1 - 2r.
\end{cases}
\]

The resulting demand curve, $p^d(Q)$, has a random component:

\[
p^d(Q) = \hat{p}(Q) + \varepsilon.
\]

How does demand volatility affect optimal pricing? Let $p^*(\sigma)$ denote the optimal price for a given level of volatility, $\sigma$. Let us focus attention on the case where the monopolist is “in” for sure when there is no demand volatility ($\sigma = 0$). Figure 9a illustrates that, if demand is sufficiently volatile, the firm risks going “out” if it keeps its price at $p^*(0)$. Going “out” is quite costly as it involves a discontinuous decline in demand. Therefore, the firm has an incentive to shade its price.

Figure 9b shows the optimal price as a function of the volatility. When volatility is low ($\sigma \leq p_{\text{max}} - p^*(0)$), the monopolist does not risk going out if it sets a price $p^*(0)$. Consequently, the optimal price is simply $p^*(0)$. When volatility is in an intermediate range ($p_{\text{max}} - p^*(0) < \sigma < \overline{\sigma}$), the firm shades its price to eliminate the risk of going “out.” In this region $p^*(\sigma) = p^*(0) - [\sigma - (p_{\text{max}} - p^*(0))]$. When volatility is sufficiently high ($\sigma > \overline{\sigma}$), the cost of shading is sufficiently high that the firm chooses to accept some risk of going “out.” In this region, the firm charges a price $p^*(\overline{\sigma})$ and it goes “out” with probability $r$.\footnote{The reason $p^*(\overline{\sigma}) < p^*(0)$ is as follows. While the demand curve has the same slope when the firm is “out” as it does when the firm is “in,” demand is actually more elastic in the “out” region.}
(a) There is a risk the firm goes from “in” to “out” if $\sigma > 0$.

(b) Optimal pricing as a function of volatility ($\sigma$).

Figure 9
Equilibrium Outcome: Piecewise Linear Demand

\[ \mu 
Q_1 = 0 
\Delta > \Delta_{\text{max}} 
\alpha 
+ ? 
- ? 
\]

\[ \pi_1(\mu, \alpha), \pi_2(\mu, \alpha) \]

Figure 10

4.2 Competition

Suppose firms 1 and 2 are engaged in the price competition game described in Section 3. Consumers’ tastes are distributed as in Figure 8a and \( \alpha \) is between \( \alpha_{\text{min}} \) and \( \alpha_{\text{max}} \), where \( \alpha_{\text{min}} = \frac{1}{2(v_1+v_2)} \) and \( \alpha_{\text{max}} = \frac{1+a(v_1-v_2)}{2v_1(1+a(v_1+v_2))} \). The condition \( \alpha > \alpha_{\text{min}} \) ensures demand is in/out; the condition \( \alpha < \alpha_{\text{max}} \) ensures demand is positive for \( p > p_{\text{max}} \).

Under these assumptions, it is possible to solve explicitly for the equilibrium of the pricing game. As Figure 10 shows, the equilibrium of the game depends upon the region into which the parameters \( \mu \) and \( \alpha \) fall (this figure is drawn to scale for

Hence, the price markup is smaller when there is a chance of going “out.”
the case where \( a = 1 \) and \( v_1 = v_2 = \frac{1}{3} \).\(^{25}\)

Several points are worth making. First, as one would expect, firm 1 “remains in” if \( \mu \) (good 1’s relative quality) is above a threshold; firm 1 “falls out” if \( \mu \) is below the threshold. The remain-in constraint (RIC) is binding when \( \mu \) is just above the threshold. When \( \mu \) is just below the threshold, firm 2 chooses the minimal price that puts it “in” (\( \Delta = \Delta_{\text{max}}^+ \)).

Second, as one crosses the threshold from the region where RIC is satisfied to the region where RIC is violated, prices jump discontinuously. Firm 1’s price jumps up and firm 2’s price jumps down. Intuitively, prices jump because firm 1 gives up on remaining “in” and firm 2 decides it is worthwhile to go “in.”

Third, competition between the firms is “normal” in the regions where RIC is loose and where \( \Delta > \Delta_{\text{max}}^+ \). Here, changes in relative quality, \( \mu \), impact the prices and quantities of both goods. Competition is abnormal when RIC binds or \( \Delta = \Delta_{\text{max}}^+ \). In those regions, changes in \( \mu \) have no effect on quantities and only affect firm 1’s price.

Finally, one might think that the firm that ends up “in” benefits from an increase in network externalities (\( \alpha \)). In fact, it is ambiguous whether an increase in \( \alpha \) benefits or hurts the “in” firm. The reason is as follows. An increase in \( \alpha \) has two effects (which are illustrated in Figure 11):

1. For a given price differential, the “in” firm gets a larger share of the market.
2. Demand is more elastic.

The “in” firm benefits from the first effect. The second effect, however, can drive more intense competition between the firms for the “in” position. This competition may be harmful to the “in” firm. A lesson is that, even in cases where one firm has a dominant market share, it may be incorrect to assume that competition is weak.

\(^{25}\)Proposition 6, stated in the Appendix, specifies the equilibrium prices and quantities in each region.
How an increase in $\alpha$ affects demand.

Figure 11

5 Multiple Goods and Platforms

It is easy to extend our model to the case of a multi-sided platform, where a firm sells multiple goods and there are cross-good externalities. One example is Uber, which sells two goods: passenger rides and driver rides. Passengers care about the number of drivers; drivers, similarly, care about the number of passengers.

Suppose the monopolist sells two goods ($j = 1, 2$). There are two populations of consumers (1, 2) with a continuum of consumers in each population; consumers in population $j$ are potential consumers of good $j$. Each consumer has a type $\theta$; the $\theta$’s are distributed $F_j$ for good $j$. Consumer $i$’s utility from consuming good $j$ is:

$$\theta_i + \mu_j + \alpha_j \cdot Q_j + \beta_j \cdot Q_l - p_j,$$

where $p_j$ denotes the price of good $j$, $\mu_j$ denotes the intrinsic quality of good $j$, the term $\alpha_j \cdot Q_j$ represents a same-good network externality, and the term $\beta_j \cdot Q_l$ represents a cross-good network externality. As before, we normalize to zero the utility from not consuming.
The following is an analog of equation (3):

\[ Q_j = 1 - F_j(p_j - \mu_j - \alpha_j \cdot Q_j - \beta_j \cdot Q_l). \]  

(13)

From equation (13), we obtain a formula for (inverse) demand:

\[ p_j^D(Q_j, Q_l) = F_j^{-1}(1 - Q_j) + \alpha_j \cdot Q_j + \beta_j \cdot Q_l + \mu_j. \]  

(14)

Consider the simple “symmetric” case where \( \alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = \alpha, \beta_1 = \beta_2 = \beta, \) and \( F_1 = F_2. \) In addition, suppose the two goods have equal initial impulses: \( Q_0^1 = Q_0^2 = Q^0. \)

Provided a suitable concavity assumption is satisfied, the firm sets a single price: \( p_1 = p_2 = p. \) In this case, the model is isomorphic to the baseline model with a single good, with \( \alpha + \beta \) appearing in place of \( \alpha. \)

**Remark**

This framework is amenable to analyzing platform competition as well. We can think about consumers of good 1 (good 2) choosing whether to purchase good 1 (good 2) from firm 1 or firm 2. One can think, for instance, about competition between Uber and other ride-sharing apps like Lyft. Our result from Section 3 that firms are not asleep has an analog in this context and can explain why Uber, despite its dominant position, is constantly working to improve the quality of its service.

**6 Conclusion**

We proposed a rich yet tractable framework to study optimal pricing and price competition in the presence of network effects.

A critical feature of markets with networks externalities is their ability to generate multiple equilibria. Such multiplicity is behind large asymmetries between winners.

\[ ^{26} \text{As noted in the literature, there is often asymmetric pricing (} p_1 \neq p_2 \text{) in two-sided markets (see especially Rochet and Tirole (2003)). Such pricing is optimal, for example, when the cross-network externalities are asymmetric (} \beta_1 \neq \beta_2 \text{). We leave this extension for future work.} \]
and losers. It is also behind the apparent paradox that it is difficult to become a winner, and yet the winning position is fragile; hence, winners are not asleep.

Understanding how one equilibrium gets picked over another is essential. We proposed a simple theory of equilibrium selection that captures the notion that a firm’s popularity exhibits a form of inertia over time, and is affected as well by salient consumers that are popular among their peers. A firm’s default popularity, inherited from the previous period, then determines whether it currently faces its worst possible demand curve (the “out” demand), its best possible curve (the “in” demand), or an intermediate version of the two (the “between” demand). Each of these demand curves has a well-behaved shape with a standard negative slope, but with a discontinuity. This simple classification immediately sheds light on the firm’s optimal pricing, its equilibrium transitions between the losing and the winning positions, and its incentives for innovation.

Our model features a form of asymmetric competition in which winning and losing firms co-exist, with the losing firm keeping the winning firm in check. This check on the winning firm is a generalized form of “limit pricing,” whereby a monopolist is disciplined by a potential entrant. In our case, rather than deterring entry outright, the winning firm needs to deter the losing firm from becoming popular. It does so by allowing the losing firm to enjoy rents from a small but loyal consumer base, a form of consolation prize.

For the interested reader, Appendix B analyzes a simple version of the model where all consumers are of the same type. This version gives the starkest case where impulses play a role; but it lacks the richness of the in/out demand curve.

In subsequent work, we expect to propose a method for valuing firms in the presence of network effects, with such effects opening the possibility of large profits for popular firms, but also leading to the risk of sudden failure.
Appendix

A Competition when Demand is Piecewise-Linear

Consider the pricing game described in Section 3 and suppose demand is piecewise-linear (as in Figure 8). Proposition 6, proven in the Online Supplement, describes the equilibrium outcome.\footnote{The Online Supplement is available at: http://www.robertakerlof.com/research.html.}

**Proposition 6.** The equilibrium of the pricing game depends upon which region parameters $\mu$ and $\alpha$ fall into. There are six regions which can be ordered from a highest-$\mu$ region to a lowest-$\mu$ region:

1. **RIC is loose and $Q_1^* = 1$ ($\mu \geq \bar{\mu}_1$):**
   
   $p_1^* = \mu + \alpha + \frac{-1 + av_2}{2v_1}$,
   
   $p_2^* = 0$.

2. **RIC is loose and $Q_1^* < 1$ ($\bar{\mu}_1 > \mu \geq \bar{\mu}_2$):**
   
   $p_1^* = \frac{1}{2}\mu - \frac{3}{4}\alpha + \frac{3 + av_2}{4v_1}$,
   
   $p_2^* = -\frac{1}{4}\mu - \frac{5}{4}\alpha + \frac{5 - av_2}{8v_1}$,
   
   $Q_1^* = \frac{v_1}{2(1-2v_1\alpha)}(\frac{1}{2}\mu - \frac{3}{2}\alpha + \frac{3 + av_2}{4v_1})$. 


3. RIC binds ($\bar{\mu}_2 > \mu \geq \bar{\mu}_3$):

\[ p_1^* = \mu + \alpha (2a(v_1 + v_2) - 1) + \frac{a(3v_2 - 2v_1) + 1}{2v_1} \]

\[ - \frac{2}{v_1} \sqrt{av_2 \left[ \frac{1}{2} (1 + a(v_2 - v_1)) - \alpha v_1 (1 - a(v_1 + v_2)) \right]}, \]

\[ p_2^* = \alpha (a(v_1 + v_2) - 1) + \frac{a(v_2 - 2v_1) + 3}{4v_1} \]

\[ - \frac{1}{v_1} \sqrt{av_2 \left[ \frac{1}{2} (1 + a(v_2 - v_1)) - \alpha v_1 (1 - a(v_1 + v_2)) \right]}, \]

\[ Q_1^* = \frac{1 - a(v_2 - v_1)}{2(1 - 2v_1 \alpha)} - \frac{\alpha v_1 (a(v_1 + v_2) + 1)}{1 - 2v_1 \alpha} \]

\[ + \frac{1}{1 - 2v_1 \alpha} \sqrt{av_2 \left[ \frac{1}{2} (1 + a(v_2 - v_1)) - \alpha v_1 (1 - a(v_1 + v_2)) \right]}, \]

4. $\Delta = \Delta_{\text{max}}^+$ ($\bar{\mu}_3 > \mu \geq \bar{\mu}_4$):

\[ p_1^* = \mu + \alpha (2a(v_1 + v_2) - 1) + \frac{1 + a(v_2 - 2v_1)}{2v_1}, \]

\[ p_2^* = \alpha (a(v_1 + v_2) - 1) + \frac{1 + a(v_2 - v_1)}{2v_1}, \]

\[ Q_1^* = \frac{1 - a(v_2 - v_1) - 2v_1 \alpha (1 + a(v_1 + v_2))}{2(1 - 2v_1 \alpha)}. \]

5. $\Delta > \Delta_{\text{max}}^+$ and $Q_1^* > 0$ ($\bar{\mu}_4 > \mu \geq \bar{\mu}_5$):

\[ p_1^* = \frac{1}{2} \mu - \frac{3}{2} \alpha + \frac{3 - av_2}{4v_1}, \]

\[ p_2^* = -\frac{1}{4} \mu - \frac{5}{4} \alpha + \frac{5 + av_2}{8v_1}, \]

\[ Q_1^* = \frac{v_1}{2(1 - 2v_1 \alpha)} \left( \frac{1}{2} \mu - \frac{3}{2} \alpha + \frac{3 - av_2}{4v_1} \right). \]
6. $\Delta > \Delta^+_{\text{max}}$ and $Q^*_1 = 0$ ($\mu < \mu_5$):

\[
p^*_1 = 0,
\]
\[
p^*_2 = -\mu + \alpha - \frac{1 - av_2}{2v_1}.
\]

The cutoffs between regions are defined as follows:

\[
\mu_1 = \frac{5 - av_2}{2v_1} - 5\alpha,
\]

\[
\mu_2 = \frac{1 - a(5v_2 - 4v_1)}{2v_1} - \alpha(4a(v_1 + v_2) + 1) + \frac{4}{v_1} \sqrt{av_2 \left[ \frac{1}{2}(1 + a(v_2 - v_1)) - \alpha v_1(1 - a(v_1 + v_2)) \right]},
\]

\[
\mu_3 = \frac{1 - a(5v_2 - 4v_1)}{2v_1} - \alpha(1 + 4a(v_1 + v_2)) + \frac{1 + 3a(v_2 - v_1) - 2\alpha v_1(1 - 3a(v_1 + v_2))}{v_1[1 + a(v_2 - v_1) + 2\alpha v_1(-1 + a(v_1 + v_2))]} \times \sqrt{av_2 \left[ \frac{1}{2}(1 + a(v_2 - v_1)) - \alpha v_1(1 - a(v_1 + v_2)) \right]},
\]

\[
\mu_4 = \frac{1 - a(3v_2 - 4v_1)}{2v_1} - \alpha(4a(v_1 + v_2) + 1),
\]

\[
\mu_5 = \frac{-3 + av_2}{2v_1} + 3\alpha.
\]
B  A Simple Case: Homogeneous Consumers

Here, we analyze a simple version of the model where all consumers are of the same type, and therefore aggregate demand is either 0 or 1. This version gives the starkest case where impulses play a role.

Monopoly

First, consider the monopoly setting. Under the assumption that all consumers are of type $\theta = 0$, demand in period $t$ is given by:

$$Q^t(p^t, Q^{t-1}) = \begin{cases} 
1, & \text{if } p^t \leq \mu + \alpha Q^{t-1} \\
0, & \text{if } p^t > \mu + \alpha Q^{t-1}.
\end{cases}$$

The monopolist faces an “in” demand curve in period $t$ if $Q^{t-1} = 1$, an “out” demand curve in period $t$ if $Q^{t-1} = 0$, or a “between” demand curve in period $t$ if $0 < Q^{t-1} < 1$.

Suppose, as in Section 2, that the monopolist chooses a price in each of $T$ periods and has a discount factor of $\delta$. Let us solve for the optimal choice of prices.

From Proposition 3, it follows that we can restrict attention to two possible pricing strategies. Strategy 1: go “in” in period 1 and stay “in” in subsequent periods. Strategy 2: go “out” in period 1 and stay “out” in subsequent periods.

Strategy 1 involves setting a price $p^1 = \mu + \alpha Q^0$ in the first period and a price $p^t = \mu + \alpha$ in subsequent periods ($t > 1$). The profits associated with this strategy are:

$$\sum_{t=1}^{T} \delta^{t-1} p^t = \mu + \alpha \left( Q^0 + \frac{\delta - \delta^T}{1-\delta} \right).$$

Strategy 2 yields a payoff of 0 to the monopolist.

The monopolist will follow Strategy 1 if and only if it yields nonnegative profits, or:

$$\mu \geq -\alpha \left( Q^0 + \frac{\delta - \delta^T}{1-\delta} \right)$$

If the monopolist’s good is of sufficiently high quality ($\mu \geq -\alpha \left( \frac{\delta - \delta^T}{1-\delta} \right)$), the monopolist chooses to go “in” (i.e., follow Strategy 1) regardless of consumers’
initial impulse. Similarly, if the monopolist’s good is of sufficiently low quality
\( \mu < -\alpha \left(1 + \frac{\delta - \delta T}{1 - \delta}\right) \), the monopolist chooses to go “out” (i.e., follow Strategy 2) regardless of consumers’ initial impulse.

If the quality of the monopolist’s good is in an intermediate range \( -\alpha \left(1 + \frac{\delta - \delta T}{1 - \delta}\right) < \mu \geq -\alpha \left(1 + \frac{\delta - \delta T}{1 - \delta}\right) \), the monopolist’s strategy depends upon the impulse. The monopolist chooses to go “in” (follow Strategy 1) if and only if the initial impulse to consume is above a threshold: \( Q_0^0 \geq -\left(\frac{\mu}{\alpha} + \frac{\delta - \delta T}{1 - \delta}\right) \).

Observe that an increase in the number of time periods \( T \) makes the monopolist more inclined to go “in” (i.e., it decreases the threshold quality for following Strategy 1). This is intuitive since the monopolist will be more willing to pay an initial cost of going “in” when there are more subsequent periods in which to reap the rewards.

**Competition**

Now, consider a competitive setting. As in Section 3, assume that firm 1 chooses its price in stage 1 and firm 2 chooses its price in stage 2. If all consumers are of type \( \theta = 0 \), demand for good 1 is given by:

\[
Q_1(\Delta, Q_1^0) = \begin{cases} 
1, & \text{if } \Delta \leq \mu + \alpha(2Q_1^0 - 1), \\
0, & \text{if } \Delta > \mu + \alpha(2Q_1^0 - 1).
\end{cases}
\]

Assume firm 1 starts “in” \( (Q_1^0 = 1) \) and sets its price before firm 2.

We can analyze the game by backward induction. Given \( p_1 \), firm 2 can either set \( p_2 \geq p_1 - \mu - \alpha \), in which case it gets zero demand and receives a payoff of zero, or it can get all of the demand by setting a price just below \( p_1 - \mu - \alpha \), in which case it receives a payoff of \( p_1 - \mu - \alpha \). It is optimal for firm 2 to price just below \( p_1 - \mu - \alpha \) if and only if \( p_1 - \mu - \alpha > 0 \).

Hence, to deter firm 2 from taking the whole market, firm 1 must set a price \( p_1 = \mu + \alpha \). Therefore, firm 1 has a choice between setting a price above \( \mu + \alpha \), with an associated payoff of 0, or setting \( p_1 = \mu + \alpha \), with an associated payoff of \( \mu + \alpha \).

Firm 1 will set \( p_1 = \mu + \alpha \), taking the whole market, if and only if \( \mu \geq -\alpha \). When
\( \mu < -\alpha \), firm 2 will take the whole market.

Observe that good 2’s quality must exceed good 1’s quality by an amount \( \alpha \) in order for firm 2 to take the market (recall that \( \mu \) denotes the relative quality of goods 1 and 2). The reason is that firm 1 has an advantage from starting “in.” The size of this advantage is increasing in the network effect (\( \alpha \)).
References


