Table 3A: Basic Determinants of Incumbent Voteshare

	Dependent Variable: Incumbent Two-Party Voteshare						
	Period: 1914-2004					*Period: 1972-2004*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Time Trend	-0.085**	-0.086**	-0.077**				
	(0.023)	-0.023	(0.024)				
Growth		0.012	-0.040	0.016	0.027	0.067	0.069
		(0.045)	(0.069)	(0.077)	(0.065)	(0.104)	(0.105)
Growth < 0			0.128	0.048	0.028	1.141**	1.118**
			(0.093)	(0.108)	(0.097)	(0.368)	(0.369)
Freshman?			-3.753**	-3.571**	-3.813**	-3.473**	-3.215**
			(0.579)	(0.596)	(0.677)	(0.597)	(0.524)
Party In Power?			1.956	1.981	1.037	-0.240	-0.190
			(2.403)	(2.413)	(1.594)	(1.328)	(1.267)
Midterm Election?			4.083*	4.200*	3.414**	2.386	2.381
			2.023	(1.960)	(1.188)	(1.284)	(1.267)
*In Power * Midterm*			-5.968	-5.946	-4.525*	-4.262	-4.213
			(3.518)	(3.531)	(2.156)	(2.418)	(2.370)
Smooth Cubic Spline?	*No*	*No*	*No*	*Yes*	*Yes*	Yes	Yes
State Fixed Effects?	*No*	*No*	*No*	*No*	*Yes*	*No*	*Yes*
N	15891	15891	15891	15891	15891	5563	5563

All Standard Errors are clustered by year. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. Election data are from ICPSR Study #6311 (Gelman and King) and Gary Jacobson. Growth data are taken from Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and the Economic Report of the President (2005). The "Smooth Cubic Spline" has two evenly spaced breakpoints (one breakpoint for the shorter period) and is continuous with a continuous first derivative. "Party in Power?" equals one if a member of the incumbent's party is President at the time of the election.

Table 4A: Gerrymandering and Incumbent Voteshare

	Dependent Variable: Incumbent Two-Party Voteshare							
	Period: 1914-2004					*Period: 1972-2004*		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Time Trend	-0.122	-0.067	0.180**			0.343*		
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.049)			(0.044)		
Redistricting Effect	0.186							
	(0.179)							
Redistricting: 1920s		3.413*	1.478	0.055339	0.055339			
		1.279844	(1.057)	1.296333	1.296333			
1930s		-3.794**	-4.806**	-3.906**	-3.851*			
		0.953872	(0.855)	1.149654	1.603996			
1940s		1.652*	-0.295	2.415*	-1.436216			
		0.630375	(0.524)	0.968609	1.588925			
1950s		1.116795	0.493	1.36463	-0.071586			
		0.727986	0.815	1.063102	1.655962			
1960s		-0.77457	-2.035**	-2.918**	-2.989361			
		0.759975	(0.644)	0.811392	1.747738			
1970s		-1.901*	-0.864	-2.17491	-5.164*	(omitted)	(omitted)	(omitted)
		0.802185	(0.668)	1.46027	1.961345			
1980s		1.30329	-0.799	-0.249685	-5.414**	-1.043	0.465	0.465
		0.833766	(0.869)	1.312045	1.662283	(0.923)	(1.025)	(1.025)
1990s		-0.950061	-2.574*	-2.809845	-8.224**	-2.919*	-2.358	-1.893
		1.0692	(1.134)	2.453101	2.597316	(1.412)	(2.328)	(2.328)
2000s		2.124*	1.039	-1.987802	-10.212**	0.544	-2.358	-2.358
		0.821993	0.626	1.545812	2.273886	(0.898)	(1.937)	(1.937)
Smooth Cubic Spline?	*No*	*No*	*No*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*No*	*Yes*	*Yes*
Table 3 Controls?	*No*	*No*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*
State Fixed Effects?	*No*	*No*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*
N	15891	15891	15891	15891	15891	5563	5563	5563

All Standard Errors are clustered by year. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. Election data are from ICPSR Study #6311 (Gelman and King) and Gary Jacobson. Growth data are taken from Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and the Economic Report of the President (2005). The "Smooth Cubic Spline" has two evenly spaced breakpoints (one breakpoint for the shorter period) and is continuous with a continuous first derivative. "Table 2 Controls" include all non-time explanatory variables from Table 2, including economic growth, freshman indicators, and political cycle variables. "Redistricting Effect" measures the discontinuous jump in the probability that an incumbant wins reelection each time a state redistricts. The single effect in the second row imposes that the jump each decade is constant. This assumption is relaxed in the coefficient estimates below. Columns 5 and 8 measure the aggregate impact of redistricting in all previous decades rather the marginal effect for a particular decade. For ease of interpretation, the dependent variable has been multiplied by 100, and so a coefficient of 3, for instance, would indicate a 3 percentage point effect.

Appendix

Table A1: Gerrymandering Classifications

State	Year			
	1972	1982	1992	2002
Alabama	PD	PD	CI	PD
Alaska	ND	ND	ND	ND
Arizona	PR	PR	CI	BP
Arkansas	BP	BP	PD	BP
California	PD*	CI*	CI	PD
Colorado	PR	CI	BP	CI
Connecticut	BP	PD	BP	BP
Delaware	ND	ND	ND	ND
Florida	BP	PD	CI*	PR
Georgia	BP	PD	CI*	PD
Hawaii	-	CI	PD	PD
Idaho	BP	BP	BP	PR
Illinois	BP	CI	CI	BP
Indiana	PR	PR	BP	PD
Iowa	CI	BP	BP	BP
Kansas	CI	CI	BP	PR
Kentucky	BP	PD	CI	BP
Louisiana	PD	BP*	CI*	BP
Maine	BP	-	-	-
Maryland	PD	PD	PD	PD
Massachusetts	PD	PD	BP	PD
Michigan	CI	CI	CI	PR
Minnesota	CI	CI	CI*	CI
Mississippi	CI	CI*	PD	CI
Missouri	CI	CI	CI	BP
Montana	CI	-	ND	ND
Nebraska	PR	PR	BP	BP
Nevada	ND	PR	PD	BP
New Hampshire	PR	BP	PR	BP
New Jersey	BP	PD*	BP	BP
New Mexico	BP	PD	PD	CI
New York	BP*	BP	CI*	BP
North Carolina	BP	PD	BP*	PD
North Dakota	ND	ND	ND	ND
Ohio	PD	BP	BP	BP
Oklahoma	PR	PD	BP	PD
Oregon	BP	BP	PD	PD
Pennsylvania	BP	PR	BP	PR*
Rhode Island	PD	PD	PD	PD
South Carolina	PD	CI	BP*	BP
South Dakota	BP	ND	ND	ND
Tennessee	BP*	PD	PD	PD
Texas	BP	CI*	PD*	BP*
Utah	PR	PR	PR	PR
Vermont	ND	ND	ND	ND
Virginia	BP	BP	PD*	BP
Washington	CI	PR*	BP	BP
West Virginia	BP	BP	PD	PD
Wisconsin	BP	BP	CI	BP
Wyoming	ND	ND	ND	ND

- denotes that the primary decadal redicstricting occurred off-cycle.

* denotes that redistricting also occurred later in the decade. See Table A2 for details.

Notes: BP = Bipartisan, CI = Court Imposed, ND = No Redistricting (Single District), PR = Partisan Republican, PD = Partisan Democrat. These data were compiled from the redistricting resource at www.fairvote.com, various contemporary news sources, and Hardy et al. (1981). We classify a redistricting as "Partisan" if and only if a party controls all relevant branches of the state government and passes a redistricting plan without the support of the opposition. We classify a redistricting as "Court Imposed" if and only if a federal or state court made the final determination of the redistricting plan.

Table A2: Off-Cycle Redistrictings

State	Year	Type	Special Cicumstances
California	1974	CI	After reluctantly imposing the Democratic legislature's plan on the state over Gov. Reagan's veto in 1972, the state Supreme Court independently drew its own plan, which was put into place before the 1974 elections.
New York	1974	BP	Federal courts ordered the legislature to redistrict New York City so as to encourage minority representation (per the VRA) and as compensation for the past practice of printing ballots in English only.
Hawaii	1976	PD	Hawaii redistricted first in 1976 after its admission as a state in 1959.
California	1984	PD	Federal courts struck down the redistricting plan in 1982. By 1984, the state
Louisiana	1984	BP	Federal courts struck down the 1982 redistricting and ordered the bipartisan state government to create a black-majority district, which it did.
Maine	1984	PD	Maine, by state law, redistricts two years later than most states.
Mississippi	1984	CI	In the first application of the VRA, the Supreme Court struck down the 1982 redistricting and federal courts created a majority-black district.
Montana	1984	BP	Montana redistricted late because of availability of Census data.
New Jersey	1984	CI	Federal courts struck down the plan drawn by the New Jersey Special
Texas	1984	PD	Federal courts drew temporary districts for the 1982 election after a pro-tracted court fight left no time for the legislative process. The overwhelmingly Democratic Texas legislature redrew acceptable boundaries in 1983.
Washington	1984	PR	A federal court ruled that Washington's Congressional districts had unjustified deviations from population equality. The state government then redrew the boundaries to correct the problem.
Maine	1994	CI	Maine, by state law, redistricts two years later than most states.
Minnesota	1994	CI	In 1992, the state courts implemented a plan that had also been litigated and
South Carolina	1994	BP	The state legislature slightly adjusted the 6th Congressional district after federal courts declared it an unconstitutional racial gerrymander in 1993.
Florida	1996	CI	Following *Shaw*, the state supreme court ruled in 1996 that the 3rd District was an unconstitutional "racial gerrymander." The court suggested a way in which
Georgia	1996	CI	In *Miller v. Johnson* (1995), the Supreme Court declared the 2nd and 11th districts to be racial gerrymanders. Courts fixed the problem.
Texas	1996	CI	After federal courts struck down the 1992 redistricting plan in the summer of 1996, they voided primary results in 13 of 30 districts and ruled that special
Louisiana	1996	CI	Federal courts struck down the 1992 plan as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander, due to a black-majority district stretching the legnth of the state. Federal courts struck down a revised plan from the state legislature in 1994 and imposed its own plan in time for the 1996 elections.
New York	1998	BP	The plan enacted by state courts in 1992 was struck down in 1996 by federal courts as not narrowly tailored to satisfy Sections 2 and 5 of the VRA. The state legislature enacted a new plan in 1997.
North Carolina	1998	BP	A series of court rulings (including *Shaw*) declared the infamous 12th district to be not narrowly tailored to satisfy the VRA as a compelling state interest. The state legislature redrew the district in 1997.
Virginia	1998	BP	The state legislature redrew the 3rd district in 1997 after it was declared an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.
Maine	2004	BP	Maine, by state law, redistricts two years later than most states.
Pennsylvania	2004	PR	} Non-court ordered and partisan off-cycle redistricting in PA and TX in 2004
Texas	2004	PR	} breaks the traditional (though not explicit) prohibition on such practices.