1.  "The Original Management Incentive Schemes", Journal of Economic Perspectives 19(4), Fall 2005, 135-144.


2.  "Optimal Gerrymandering: Sometimes Pack But Never Crack" (with John Friedman), American Economic Review 98(1), March 2008, 113-144.


3.  "The Rising Incumbent Advantage: What’s Gerrymandering Got to Do With It?" (with John Friedman), Journal of Politics 71(2), April 2009, 593-611. (web appendix)


4.  "Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm: What Have We Learned over the Past 25 Years?" (with Philippe Aghion),  Journal of Economic Perspectives 25(2), Spring 2011, 181-197.


5.  "Rethinking Partisan and Racial Gerrymandering" (with Adam Cox), 78 University of Chicago Law Review 78(2), 2011, 553-604.


6.  "Measuring the Compactness of Political Districting Plans" (with Roland Fryer), Journal of Law and Economics, August 2011, 493-535.


7.  "The Nature of Tournaments" (with Robert Akerlof), Economic Theory 51(2), 2012, 489-513.


8.  "Constitutional Amendment Rules: The Denominator Problem" (with Rosalind Dixon), in Comparative Constitutional Design (Tom Ginsburg ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press (2012), 195-218.


9. "Organization and Information: Firms’ Governance Choices in Rational-Expectations Equilibrium" (with Robert Gibbons and Michael Powell), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(4), 2012, 1813-1841.


10. "Subgame Perfect Implementation under Information Perturbations" (with Philippe Aghion, Drew Fudenberg, Takashi Kunimoto and Olivier Tercieux), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(4), 2012, 1843-1881. Online appendix here.


11. "A Theory of Rule Development" (with Glenn Ellison), Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 30(4), 2014,649-682.


12. "Optimal Primaries" (with Patrick Hummel), Journal of Public Economics, 109, 2014, 64-75.


13. "Simple Mechanisms and Preferences for Honesty" (with Navin Kartik and Olivier Tercieux), Games and Economic Behavior, January 2014, 284-290.


14. "Renegotiation Design by Contract" (with Anup Malani), University of Chicago Law Review, 81(1),  2014, 151-178.


15.  "Incomplete Contracts and Mechanism Design" in P. Aghion, M. Dewatripont, P. Legros and L. Zingales (eds.), The Impact of Incomplete Contracts in Economics, Oxford University Press, 2016, 358-362.


16. "Gerrymandering" in Encyclopedia of Race, Ethnicity and Nationalism, Wiley-Blackwell, 2015.


17. "Voting and Elections: New Social Science Perspectives" Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 12, 2016, 255–272.


18. "A Process for Non-Partisan Redistricting" in J. Schwab (ed.) An Illinois Constitution for the 21st Century. forthcoming 2016.


19. "Law and Economics", in G. Appleby and R. Dixon (eds.), The Critical Judgments Project, Federation Press, 2016.


20. "Movers and Shakers" (with Robert Akerlof), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131 (4), 2016, 1849-1874.


21. "The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation--An Empirical Investigation" (with Philippe Aghion, Ernst Fehr and Tom Wilkening), Journal of the European Economic Association, August 2017.


22. "A Nobel Prize for Property-Rights Theory," Games, 8(4), 2017.


23. "When to Drop a Bombshell" (with Gabriele Gratton and Anton Kolotilin). Review of Economic Studies, conditionally accepted. [Additional Material A], [Additional Material B]

Working Papers

Richard Holden